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COMMENT
Constitutional Law: Retarded Justice: The Supreme
Court's Subjective Standards for Capital Punishment of the
Mentally Retarded
[W]e must never forget, that it is a [C]onstitution we are
expounding.
Chief Justice Marshall'
I. Introduction
For the first time in thirteen years, the U.S. Supreme Court revisited the
question of whether capital punishment of mentally retarded criminals is cruel
and unusual under the Eighth Amendment in Atkins v. Virginia.2 In a
landmark decision, the Court decided to "tighten the noose" on states that
wish to impose the death penalty on mentally retarded criminals. However,
the rationale behind this holding calls into question whether the Court has
overstepped its constitutional boundaries by subjectively legislating for the
American people.
This Comment will argue that the Court erred in its decision in Atkins v.
Virginia, misinterpreting established principles of Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. First, neither the text nor the history of the Eighth Amendment
support the Court's holding that capital punishment for mentally retarded
criminals is unconstitutional.3 Second, in calibrating the evolving standards
of decency under the Eighth Amendment, the decision gives little weight to
objective indicators that the Court has previously declared to be "[t]he clearest
1. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
2. 536 U.S. 304(2002). The Supreme Court last addressed the issue of capital punishment
of mentally retarded criminals in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), abrogated by Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). The Court had granted certiorari in McCarver v. North
Carolina, 532 U.S. 941 (2001). However, the Court remanded that case to state court because
of a change in North Carolina's capital sentencing scheme and factual controversy. Karl Keys,
CAP. DEF. WKLY., Sept. 24,2001, http://www.capitaldefenseweekly.com/archives/010924.htm.
In McCarver, Ernest Paul McCarver and an accomplice were convicted of the ambush and
subsequent murder of an elderly man in 1987. The apparent motive for the crime was revenge,
as McCarver had suspected that the victim was responsible for the revocation of McCarver's
probation three years earlier. A forensic psychologist testified that McCarver suffered from
"borderline intellectual functioning with the intellectual and emotional capacity of a ten- or
twelve-year-old." Paul B. Herbert & Kathryn A. Young, Capital Punishment and the Mentally
Retarded, AAPL NEWSLETrER, Sept. 2001, at 19-20.
3. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
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and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary [American] values."4
Lastly, in prohibiting capital punishment of all mentally retarded criminals,
the Court erroneously concluded that no mentally retarded person can have the
requisite culpability for the imposition of a death sentence.'
Part II of this Comment addresses the Court's Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence by tracing the evolution of the Eighth Amendment itself and
then discussing how the element of mental retardation can affect a criminal's
treatment under the Amendment. Part Mll focuses specifically on Penry v.
Lynaugh,6 the Supreme Court's 1989 decision that established the precedent
allowing capital punishment for mentally retarded criminals. Part IV then
provides a background of Oklahoma law regarding capital punishment of
mentally retarded criminals. Part V provides a statement of the case forAtkins
v. Virginia, including the facts, holding, and the Court's reasoning. Part VI
analyzes the Court's holding, and Part VII describes the impact of the holding
on federal, state, and Oklahoma law.
II. The Supreme Court's Framework for Analysis
A. Evolution of Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence
The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits excessive bail,
excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishment.7 Although the text of the
Eighth Amendment appears simple on its face, the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the exact meaning of the terms "cruel and unusual" has
proven to be elusive.8 Unfortunately for the Court, the Framers of the
Constitution left little evidence of their intent for including a clause
prohibiting cruel and unusual punishments.9 Furthermore, legislative history
surrounding the adoption of the Eighth Amendment into the Bill of Rights
provides minimal guidance to ascertain what is truly meant by the phrase
"cruel and unusual punishment."'
4. Penry, 492 U.S. at 331; see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 831 (1988)
(plurality opinion); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788-96 (1982).
5. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.
6. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
8. RANDALLCOYNE &LYNENTZEROTH, CAPITALPUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIALPROCESS
51 (2d ed. 2001); see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 n.32 (1958) (plurality opinion)
(stating that it is unclear whether the word "unusual" has any qualitative meaning different from
the word "cruel," and that the Court has failed to draw precise distinctions between punishments
that are cruel but not unusual or punishments that are unusual but not cruel).
9. COYNE& ENTZEROTH, supra note 8, at 51.
10. Id.
880 [Vol. 56:879
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Despite this lack of concrete historical evidence, the basis of the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment appears to have been
developed in seventeenth-century England." It is believed that this
terminology originated with the English Declaration of Rights in 1689.12 The
English adopted a clause against cruel and unusual punishments for two
reasons. First, they wanted to abolish punishments that were "unauthorized
by statute and outside the jurisdiction of the sentencing court."13 Second, the
English sought to reaffirm a social policy against disproportionate criminal
penalties.14
It is upon these two principles that the U.S. Supreme Court has built its
framework for analyzing whether or not certain punishments are cruel and
unusual. In Weems v. United States,5 the Court held that a fifteen-year prison
sentence for the crime of falsifying a public and official document was
unconstitutional on the basis that the Eighth Amendment forbids punishment
that is deemed "excessive."' 6 In so holding, the Court reasoned that "it is a
precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and
proportioned to [the] offense."' 7  The Court has continued to use this
proportionality analysis in determining whether a punishment is
disproportionate to the crime committed, and if so, rendering it
unconstitutional. 18
11. Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted": The Original
Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839 (1969).
12. Id. at 840.
13. Id. at 860.
14. Id.
15. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
16. Id. at 381.
17. Id. at 367. In Weems, an officer of the Bureau of Coast Guard and Transportation of
the U.S. Government of the Philippine Islands intentionally defrauded the U.S. government by
falsifying a cash book that was under his supervision. Id. at 357. Weems was convicted,
sentenced to fifteen years of cadena (imprisonment at hard labor), and ordered to pay a fine of
4000 pesos. Id. at 358.
18. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997-98 (1991). In Harmelin, the
Supreme Court held that a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for
possession of 672 grams of cocaine was not "cruel and unusual" within the meaning of the
Eighth Amendment. Id. at 961, 996. In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy restated the
concept of proportionality in that "[t]he Eighth Amendment does not require strict
proportionality between crime and sentence," rather it only prohibits "'grossly
disproportionate"' punishments. Id. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy further
laid out the common principles that the Court should apply when performing a proportionality
analysis. These principles include "the primacy of the legislature, the variety of legitimate
penological schemes, the nature of our federal system, and the requirement that proportionality
review be guided by objective factors." Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Solem v. Helm,
463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983) (holding that if the Court finds a punishment to be "grossly
20031
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Building on the Weems theory of "excessiveness" in judging the
constitutionality of punishment, the Court in Trop v. Dulles 9 went so far as
to state that "[tihe basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment [was]
nothing less than the dignity of man."2° The Court recognized that the words
of the Eighth Amendment, while imprecise in nature and scope, were not
static.21 Indeed, the Court determined that the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment could only properly be derived from the "evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."22
In 1976, the Supreme Court further elaborated on its framework for
analyzing Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment issues. In Gregg
v. Georgia,23 the Court reasoned that a punishment is excessive only if it
"involve[s] the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain., 24 According to the
Court, the death penalty serves the two principal social purposes of deterrence
and retribution.2' The Court also reiterated its proportionality analysis from
Weems, reasoning that a punishment is excessive if it was "grossly out of
proportion to the severity of the crime. "26
One year later, in Coker v. Georgia,27 the Court labeled barbaric and
disproportionate" to the crime, the penalty can be struck down as excessive punishment
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
19. 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion). In Trop, a U.S. Army private had escaped
during wartime from a stockade, where he was being punished for a previous crime. Id. at 87.
Although his escape was discovered upon his return to the stockade the next day and he
willingly surrendered, he was dishonorably discharged and sentenced to three years of hard
labor. Id. at 87-88. Additionally, because of his conviction for wartime desertion, he had lost
his U.S. citizenship per section 401(g) of the Nationality Act of 1940. Id. at 88.
20. Id. at 100.
21. Id. at 100-01.
22. Id. at 101.
23. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion) (Gregg 1). In Gregg, the petitioner was
convicted of two counts of armed robbery and murder and sentenced to death. Id. at 160.
However, the Georgia Supreme Court vacated the death sentences for the two armed robberies,
despite armed robbery being a capital offense under Georgia law, on the basis that the death
penalty had rarely been imposed in Georgia for armed robbery. Gregg v. State, 210 S.E.2d 659,
667 (Ga. 1974) (Gregg II). Using this same reasoning, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
death sentence for the two murder convictions on the basis that the sentence, when compared
to the evidence and sentencing in similar cases, was not excessive or disproportionate to
sentences for comparable crimes. Gregg I, 428 U.S. at 187.
24. Gregg I, 428 U.S. at 173.
25. Id. at 183. The Court also recognized another possible purpose for the death penalty
as being the incapacitation of dangerous criminals and the consequent prevention of future
crimes that they may commit. This is known as the "specific deterrence" rationale. Id. at 183
n.28; see also People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 896 (Cal. 1972).
26. Gregg I, 428 U.S. at 173.
27. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). In Coker, a prisoner who was serving sentences for murder, rape,
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excessive forms of meaningless punishment as "nothing more than ... [a]
needless imposition of pain and suffering. 28 In reaching its conclusion, the
Coker Court emphasized that its decisions regarding Eighth Amendment
issues should not be, or appear to be, derived from the subjective views of the
Justices. 29 Rather, the Court emphasized the importance of objective factors
such as the attitudes of state legislatures and responses of sentencing juries
when handing down Eighth Amendment judgments." In regard to sentencing
juries, the Court restated its position in Gregg that the jury is a "significant
and reliable objective index of contemporary values because it is so directly
involved." 31
The vital role of the sentencing jury, emphasized by the Court in Gregg,
was a critical factor in the Court's reasoning in Enmund v. Florida.32 In
reversing a capital sentence, the Court again strongly emphasized the actions
of sentencing juries in capital punishment cases.33 The Enmund Court was
persuaded by statistics showing that an overwhelming number of juries were
unwilling to impose the death penalty on a defendant who was merely an
accomplice to a murder.3 4 Additionally, the Enmund Court held that
defendants facing the imposition of the death penalty have a constitutional
right to have a sentencing jury render an "individual appraisal" of their
criminal culpability. 35
In the late 1980s, four cases came to the forefront that would set the tone
for the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence with respect to the
kidnapping, and aggravated assault, escaped from a Georgia prison, committed armed robbery,
and raped an adult woman. Id. at 587. He was convicted of the armed robbery and the rape,
and sentenced to death for the rape. Id. at 591. The Court held that "the Eighth Amendment
bars not only those punishments that are 'barbaric' but also those that are 'excessive' in relation
to the crime." Id. at 592. In this case, a sentence of death for the crime of rape was considered
"grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment;" thus, it violated the Eighth Amendment.
Id.
28. Id. at 592.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 596.
32. 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (Enmund 1).
33. Id. at 794-95. In Enmund, an elderly couple was robbed and fatally shot at their Florida
home. Id. at 784. Enmund did not take part in the actual shooting but instead drove the
getaway car. Id. He was convicted under Florida law as a constructive aider and abettor and,
more importantly, as a principal to first-degree murder. Id. at 785. As a principal to first-degree
murder, Enmund was eligible for a death penalty sentence. Id. The Florida Supreme Court
found it irrelevant that Enmund had not killed anybody, and that he was not even in the house
at the time of the killings. Enmund v. State, 399 So. 2d 1362, 1370 (Fla. 1981) (Enmund 11).
34. Enmund 1, 458 U.S. at 794.
35. Id. at 801; see also Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 395-96 (1986).
20031
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personal characteristics of defendants. Two of these cases, Thompson v.
Oklahoma36 and Stanford v. Kentucky,37 addressed the issue of whether capital
punishment of minors is cruel and unusual. Two other cases, Ford v.
Wainwright" and Penry v. Lynaugh, required the Court to address the issue
of whether capital punishment of mentally challenged criminals was cruel and
unusual.
In Thompson, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals' decision upholding a capital sentence for a fifteen-year-old
individual who had committed murder.39 A plurality of the Court held that
executing a person under the age of sixteen is cruel and unusual punishment
within Eighth Amendment principles because there is considerable risk
inherent in a death penalty statute that does not establish a minimum age for
the punishment. 4° In arriving at this conclusion, the Court reviewed relevant
legislation and jury determinations as well as the reasons why a mature society
would choose to accept or reject capital punishment for a person who was
under sixteen years old at the time that they commit their crimes.4
Despite its holding, the Supreme Court was unwilling to conclude that a
national consensus existed, even though eighteen of the thirty-seven states
36. 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (plurality opinion). In Thompson, a fifteen-year-old actively
participated with three older persons in a brutal murder. Id. at 819. According to the evidence,
the victim had been shot and his throat, chest, and abdomen had been slashed. Additionally,
his body had been chained to a concrete block and thrown into the river. Authorities found the
body four weeks later. Each of the four participants in the murder was separately convicted and
sentenced to death. Id.
37. 492 U.S. 361 (1989). In Stanford, the petitioner was a seventeen-year, four-month old
individual at the time when he and an accomplice were involved in the robbery, rape,
sodomization, and murder of a twenty-year-old gas station attendant. Id. at 365. He actually
shot the victim in the face and the back of the head at point-blank range. The men ended up
only getting away with cigarettes, a couple gallons of fuel, and a small amount of cash.
Petitioner explained that he had shot the victim because she lived next door to him and would
be able to recognize him. Id.
38. 477 U.S. 399 (1986). In Ford, the petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced
to death. Id. at 401. At the time that he committed the crime, at his trial, and at sentencing there
was no sign that petitioner was incompetent. Id. However, eight years subsequent to his
conviction, petitioner began to gradually experience signs of mental illness, mostly in the form
of delusions, which included a belief that he was Pope John Paul II and that he had appointed
nine new justices to the Supreme Court of Florida. Id. at 402. Numerous evaluations deemed
petitioner to have "'a severe, uncontrollable, mental disease which closely resembles "Paranoid
Schizophrenia With Suicide Potential"' - a 'major mental disorder."' Id. at 402-03.
39. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838, vacating Thompson v. State, 1986 OK CR 130, 724 P.2d
780.
40. Id. at 857.
41. Id. at 822.
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allowing capital punishment had set a minimum age at sixteen.42 In a
concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor reasoned that these statistics were
inconclusive because they did not indicate how many juries had been faced
with sentencing a juvenile to death, nor did they indicate how many times a
prosecutor had exercised discretion by refraining from seeking the death
penalty against a juvenile offender.43 Furthermore, Justice O'Connor voiced
her concern that state legislatures such as Oklahoma's had not fully
considered what the minimum age for capital punishment ought to be, whereas
the legislatures of the states that had a minimum age had fully considered the
issue."
In a similar case one year later, the Supreme Court in Stanford affirmed the
death penalty conviction of a seventeen-year-old who had committed murder.45
Following its reasoning in Enmund, the Stanford Court held that in the realm
of capital punishment, the Constitution requires individual consideration of
each defendant's case.46 The Court noted that the petitioner had failed to meet
his heavy burden of proving that a national consensus existed against capital
punishment for criminals under eighteen years of age.47 The Court further
reasoned that the most primary and reliable evidence of a national consensus,
and thus an evolving standard of decency, is found in the pattern of federal
and state legislation.48 The Stanford Court held that public opinion polls, as
well as the views of interest groups and professional organizations, could not
provide an adequate foundation on which to base a constitutional decision.49
In a decision addressing the issue of mental incapacity, the Supreme Court
in Ford v. Wainwright reversed a death sentence imposed on a defendant for
42. Id. at 826-27.
43. Id. at 850-51 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 849-51 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
45. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989). The Court also decided Wilkins v.
Missouri as a companion case to Stanford. Id. at 361. In Wilkins, a sixteen-year-old male
murdered a convenience store clerk during a robbery. Id. at 366. According to the record,
Wilkins had intended to rob the store and shoot "'whoever was behind the counter' because
"'a dead person can't talk."' Id. Wilkins succeeded in his plan, but rather than shooting his
victim, he stabbed her in the chest and neck, leaving her to die. Id.
46. Id. at 375; see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (stating that within the
criminal justice system, and especially in cases dealing with capital punishment, individualized
consideration is a constitutional requirement).
47. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 373 (applying the standard set in Gregg v. Georgia that "[ilt is
not the burden of [the state] to establish a national consensus approving what [its] citizens have
voted to do; rather, it is the 'heavy burden' of petitioners to establish a national consensus
against it") (citation omitted).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 377.
20031
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a murder that he committed prior to becoming insane.5" The Court held that
imposing capital punishment on criminals unable to comprehend the basis for
the punishment or its consequences is cruel and unusual by Eighth
Amendment standards. 5' The Ford Court reasoned that at the time the
Framers drafted the Bill of Rights, capital punishment of the insane was
deemed to be cruel and unusual punishment.5" Furthermore, at that time, no
state legislatures allowed capital punishment to be enforced against the
insane.53 Although Ford dealt with the insane criminal rather than the
mentally retarded criminal, the Court's reasoning served as precedent for its
later decisions regarding capital punishment of mentally retarded criminals.
B. Mental Retardation and Criminal Punishment
The most critical aspect in an analysis of the effect that mental retardation
has on the culpability of a criminal is that mental retardation and insanity are
not one and the same.54 Insanity can be described in terms of social and legal
norms and is not a medical phenomenon." Persons who are declared insane
have such a severe mental disorder that they are rendered legally incapacitated
and are excused from civil or criminal liability.56
Mental retardation, unlike insanity, is not a legal phenomenon and does not
prevent a person from having legal capacity; furthermore, it is not even
considered a mental illness.57 A distinction can be made that "[m]entally ill
people encounter disturbances in their thought processes and emotions," while
50. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 418 (1986).
51. Id. at 417.
52. Id. at 408.
53. Id.
54. Juliet L. Ream, Capital Punishmentfor Mentally Retarded Offenders: Is It Morally and
Constitutionally Impermissible, 19 Sw. U. L. REv. 89, 122 (1990).
55. COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 8, at 268.
56. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 797 (7th ed. 1999).
57. James Ellis & Ruth Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 414, 423-25 (1985). Important consequences for the criminal justice system
flow from the difference between mental illness and mental retardation. Id. at 423. Many forms
of mental illness are "temporary, cyclical, or episodic." Id. at 424. In contrast, mental
retardation involves a permanent mental impairment. Id.; see also Lyn Entzeroth, Putting the
Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendant to Death: Charting the Development of a National
Consensus to Exempt the Mentally Retarded from the Death Penalty, 52 ALA. L. REV. 911
(2001); Salvador Uy, From the Ashes of Penry v. Lynaugh: The Diminished Intent Approach
to the Trial and Sentencing of the Mentally Retarded Offender, 21 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
565, 577-78 (1990). "Mental illness and mental retardation are not mutually exclusive
conditions; some mentally retarded people are also mentally ill." Ellis & Luckasson, supra, at
425. "Dr. Frank Menolascino has estimated that the incidence of mental illness among mentally
retarded people is approximately thirty percent." Id.
[Vol. 56:879
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"mentally retarded people have limited abilities to learn."58 The American
Association of Mental Retardation (AAMR) defines mental retardation as "[a
person having] substantial limitations both in intellectual functioning and in
adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive
skills. This disability originates before age 18."" 9
To test whether a person has sub-average general intellectual functioning,
the standard instrument used is the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scales test
(WAIS-IH).60 This test determines a person's intellectual quotient (IQ) by
adding together the number of points the person attains on various subtests
and then converts these points into a scaled score.6 The test measures
intelligence levels ranging from 45 to 155.62 The average test score is 100; the
person scoring 100 is considered to have an average level of "cognitive
functioning. 63
Although all mentally retarded people share the characteristic of sub-
average intellectual functioning, they do not all function at the same level.' 4
58. Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 57, at 424.
59. AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION,
CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 8 (10th ed. 2002). See also AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
(4th rev. ed.) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR], which states:
Four degrees of severity can be specified, reflecting the degree of intellectual
impairment: Mild, Moderate, Severe, and Profound.
Mild Mental Retardation IQ Level 50-55 to approximately 70
Moderate Mental Retardation IQ Level 35-40 to 50-55
Severe Mental Retardation IQ Level 20-25 to 35-40
Profound Mental Retardation IQ Level Below 20 or 25
... Mild mental retardation is roughly equivalent to what used to be referred to as
the educational category of "educable." This group constitutes the largest segment
(about 85%) of those with the disorder. As a group, people with this level of
Mental Retardation typically develop social and communication skills during the
preschool years (ages 0-5 years), have minimal impairment in sensorimotor areas,
and often are not distinguishable from children without Mental Retardation until
a later age. By their late teens, they can acquire academic skills up to
approximately the sixth-grade level. During their adult years, they usually achieve
social and vocational skills adequate for minimum self-support, but may need
supervision, guidance, and assistance, especially when under unusual social or
economic stress. Without appropriate supports, individuals with Mild Mental
Retardation can usually live successfully in the community, either independently
or in supervised settings.
Id. § 317.00, at 43.
60. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 309 n.5 (2002).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Morgan Cloud & George B. Shepherd, Words Without Meaning: The Constitution,
2003]
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As a group, mentally retarded people vary considerably in their abilities.65 A
mentally retarded individual can "be anywhere on a continuum from
independent to dependent.' 6 6 Furthermore, there are four degrees of mental
retardation, ranging from mild to profound, each based on the level of an
individual's IQ.67 Overall, mildly mentally retarded people make up an
overwhelming majority of the mentally retarded population.68 These
individuals, although classified as mentally retarded, can live successfully
within a social community.69
It is generally accepted without argument that those mentally retarded
people who qualify under the law for criminal responsibility should be tried
and punished when they have committed a crime. 70  However, does a
criminal's mental retardation significantly hinder his ability to receive a fair
trial? In Penry v. Lynaugh, the Court described how the knowledge that a
criminal is mentally retarded could both aid and impede a jury's ability to
sentence him for a crime.7' In one sense, mental retardation can be viewed as
a mitigating factor, in that juries may believe that a person's mental
retardation reduces both his criminal capability and culpability.72
Alternatively, mental retardation can also be viewed as an aggravating factor,
in that a jury may consider a person who suffers from impaired intellectual
and emotional development to present a greater risk of committing future
crimes in society.73 Because of the imprecise effect that mental retardation
has on different instances of criminal activity, the Penry Court failed to
impose a blanket exclusion of capital punishment for all mentally retarded
criminals.
Confessions, and Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U. CI. L. REv. 495, 509 (2002) ("People with
mental retardation are not a homogeneous group. They vary enormously in aptitude,
personality, achievement, and temperament.").
65. Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 57, at 427.
66. Id.
67. See also supra note 59 and accompanying text.
68. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312, 323 (Va. 2000) ("Mild mental retardation
(I.Q., 55 to 70) characterizes the largest group of persons with mental retardation, possibly as
many as 85 percent of the total."), rev'd, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
69. David L. Rumley, A License to Kill: The Categorical Exemption of the Mentally
Retarded from the Death Penalty, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1299, 1323 (1993).
70. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306.
71. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304 (2002).
72. Id. at 337.
73. Id. at 324.
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III. Establishing Precedent - The Supreme Court's Ruling in Penry v.
Lynaugh
In Penry, the Supreme Court held in a 5-4 decision that capital punishment
of mentally retarded criminals does not violate the Eighth Amendment's ban
on cruel and unusual punishment.74 The petitioner, Johnny Paul Penry, had
been convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death.75 Although the jury
found Penry competent to stand trial, psychological tests confirmed that Penry
suffered from mild to moderate mental retardation.76
For the purpose of measuring mental retardation, the Supreme Court relied
on the American Association of Mental Deficiency's (AAMD) classification
system.77 According to this system, individuals with an IQ ranging from 50-55
to 70 were labeled as "mildly" retarded.7" Penry's IQ measured between 50
and 63." The State introduced evidence from two psychologists, both of
whom concluded that Penry "knew the difference between right and wrong
and had the potential to honor the law" at the time he committed the murder.8"
Furthermore, one of the psychologists stated that Penry' s low IQ score may,
in fact, have "underestimated his [level of] alertness and understanding of
what went on around him."81
Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court adhered strictly to established
principles of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. The Court began its analysis
by looking to the text and history of the Eighth Amendment and by noting that
at common law, only the capital punishment of those considered "idiots" and
"lunatics" was prohibited. 2 The Court next determined whether there was
74. Id. at 340. In Penry, the petitioner brutally raped, beat, and stabbed the victim with a
pair of scissors. Id. at 307. He had recently been released on parole after a prior conviction of
rape. Id. Petitioner confessed to the crime, and although he was diagnosed as mentally
retarded, the jury found him competent to stand trial. Id. at 307-08. Petitioner's mother
testified that he "was unable to learn in school and never finished the first grade." Id. at 309.
Additionally, petitioner's sister testified that when he was a child, his mother routinely beat him
over the head with a belt and locked him in a room for long periods of time without access to
a toilet. Id.
75. Id. at 310-11.
76. Id. at 307-08.
77. Id. at 308 n.l.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 307.
80. Id. at 309.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 331-33. Justice O'Connor quoted Blackstone: "'[I]diots and lunatics are not
chargeable for their own acts, if committed when under these incapacities .... [A] total idiocy,
or absolute insanity, excuses from the guilt, and of course from the punishment, of any criminal
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objective evidence of an emerging national consensus against executing
mentally retarded criminals. The Court accurately stated that "[t]he clearest
and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation
enacted by the country's legislatures."83 The Court observed that the fact that
only two states had banned the execution of mentally retarded criminals at that
time served as insufficient evidence of a national consensus."
The Court also addressed Penry's argument that public opinion polls and
professional organizations strongly supported prohibiting capital punishment
for mentally retarded criminals. In keeping with established Eighth
Amendment principles, the Court refused to give weight to this evidence
because it had not yet materialized into an objective factor - specifically,
state-enacted legislation.85
Next, the Court concentrated on the issue of whether capital punishment of
mentally retarded criminals serves the social purposes of retribution and
deterrence for which the death penalty is intended. The rationale behind these
dual purposes for capital punishment is that "'a criminal sentence must be
directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender."86 Using
this rationale, the Court refused to "conclude that all mentally retarded people
of Penry' s ability - by virtue of their mental retardation alone, and apart from
any individualized consideration of their personal responsibility - inevitably
lack... the degree of culpability associated with the death penalty."8" The
Court recognized that while all mentally retarded people share the
characteristics of low intelligence and poor adaptive behavior, there are
obvious variations among the levels at which the mentally retarded suffer.88
action committed under such deprivation of the senses .... ' Id. at 331 (quoting 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24-*25) (alterations in original).
83. Id. at 331.
84. Id. at 334. Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(j) (Supp. 1988), and Maryland, MD.
CODE ANN., art. 27, § 412(t)(1) (1989), were the only two states that had banned capital
punishment for a mentally retarded criminal who had committed a capital offense. Penry, 492
U.S. at 334.
85. Penry, 492 U.S. at 335. Penry pointed to several public opinion polls that indicated a
strong public opposition to capital punishment for mentally retarded criminals. This included
"a poll taken in Texas" finding "that 86% of those polled supported the death penalty." Id. at
334. Additionally, Penry indicated that the AAMR, the nation's "oldest and largest
organization" that works with mentally retarded people, opposed capital punishment for
mentally retarded criminals. Id. at 335.
86. Id. at 336 (quoting Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987)).
87. Id. at 338.
88. Id. Penry argued that the Court should rely on the concept of the "mental age" of the
mentally retarded criminal to hold that any criminal with a mental age below seven should not
be eligible for capital punishment. Id. at 339. The Court rejected this argument and pointed out
the various problems associated with using mental age as a determinant in whether a mentally
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The Court reasoned that the abilities of mentally retarded people vary greatly
"'from totally dependent to nearly independent people.'
89
In conclusion, the Court recognized that mental retardation may, in fact,
lessen a person's culpability regarding a capital offense.9" However, the Court
declined to rule that the Eighth Amendment bars capital punishment of those
criminals suffering from similar levels of mental retardation as Penry solely
on the basis of their mental retardation. 9' Rather, the Court stated that
sentencing juries should give credence to a criminal's mental retardation as a
mitigating factor, allowing for the determination of whether capital
punishment is an appropriate punishment to be made on a case-by-case basis.92
Although the Supreme Court's holding in Penry established that mentally
retarded criminals could be sentenced to capital punishment, not all states with
death penalty statutes were willing to follow suit. Over the next thirteen
years, sixteen states passed legislation barring the execution of mentally
retarded criminals.93 Oklahoma, on the other hand, continued to allow such
punishment.94 Even as the Oklahoma courts complied with Penry by allowing
juries to consider mental retardation as a mitigating factor,95 the Oklahoma
legislature was not yet willing to exclude all mentally retarded criminals from
capital punishment.
IV. Oklahoma Law Prior to Atkins
The Oklahoma Constitution grants greater protection to its citizens
regarding criminal punishment than does the U.S. Constitution. Article 11,
section 9 of the Oklahoma Constitution forbids the state from imposing any
punishment that is "cruel or unusual."96 This determination differs from the
retarded criminal is eligible for capital punishment. Id.
89. Id. at 338 (quoting AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY, CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL
RETARDATION 12 (Herbert J. Grossman ed., 1983)); see also Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 57.
90. Penry, 492 U.S. at 340.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314-15 (2002) (Kentucky, Tennessee (1990), New
Mexico (1991), Arkansas, Colorado, Washington, Indiana, Kansas (1993-1994), New York
(1995), Nebraska (1998), South Dakota, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Missouri, and North
Carolina (2000-2001)).
94. "Oklahoma has executed several prisoners with developmental disabilities, including
Wanda Jean Allen, Robert Eagle Clayton, Cornel Cooks, Charles Foster, and Bobby Ross."
Oklahoma Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty, Governor Keating Vetoes House Bill 2635,
www.ocadp.org/news/2002/HB2635- update.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2004).
95. Salazar v. State, 1998 OK CR 70 137, 973 P.2d 315, 327; Penry, 492 U.S. at 340.
96. OKLA. CONST. art. 11, § 9 (emphasis added); see also Dodd v. State, 1994 OK CR 51,
879 P.2d 822.
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Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which requires a punishment to
be "cruel and unusual" before it is forbidden.97 Although providing greater
protection to those facing criminal punishment in general, Oklahoma has
chosen not to afford specific protection to mentally retarded criminals who are
facing capital punishment.
In Lambert v. State,9" the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals refused to
hold that the Oklahoma Constitution prohibits capital punishment of mentally
retarded criminals.99 Judge Lumpkin, in a concurring opinion, pointed out that
it is not the role of the judiciary to determine what type of punishment should
be considered cruel or unusual. ' 00 Rather, it should be a legislative
determination.'0 ' He reasoned that a "judicial branch of government,
especially a court sitting only in review of appeals from criminal cases, is ill-
equipped to make any determination[s] of public policy."' 2  Therefore,
according to Judge Lumpkin, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has a
constitutional duty to apply only those public policies that are codified in the
Oklahoma statutes. 03
In Hammon v. State,'°4 the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals again
97. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added).
98. 1999 OK CR 17,984 P.2d 221 (Lambert 1). In Lambert, the defendant was convicted
of robbery, kidnapping, and murder. Id. 3, 984 P.2d at 226. In 1987, Robert Wayne Lambert
and Scott Hain locked their two victims into the trunk of a car, cut the gas line and set the car
on fire. Id. 2, 984 P.2d at 226. "The victims died of asphyxiation and thermal bums." Id.
Lambert claimed that he should not receive the death penalty because he had previously been
hospitalized for mental illness and that he did not understand the nature of the charges brought
against him. Lambert v. State, 1991 OK CR 22, 1 5, 808 P.2d 72, 73 (Lambert 11). However,
in a post-examination competency hearing, the trial court found Lambert competent to stand
trial. Lambert 1, 20, 984 P.2d at 230.
99. Lambert I, 59, 984 P.2d at 238.
100. See id. 1 11, 984 P.2d at 247 (Lumpkin, J., concurring).
101. Id. 6,984 P.2d at 245 (Lumpkin, J., concurring); see also Hammon v. State, 2000 OK
CR 7, 93, 999 P.2d 1082, 1101 ("It would properly be a legislative function, not a judicial
function, to determine whether certain mentally retarded persons could be convicted of capital
murder and yet be exempt from the death penalty, to decide what level of retardation would be
required, and to define a reliable and objective test that would distinguish those persons entitled
to that exemption."); Salazar v. State, 1998 OK CR 70, 47, 973 P.2d 315, 329.
102. Lambert I, 11, 984 P.2d at 247 (Lumpkin, J., concurring).
103. Id. 6, 984 P.2d at 245-46 (Lumpkin, J., concurring).
104. 2000 OK CR 7, 999 P.2d 1082 (Hammon 1). In Hammon, the defendant was charged
with felony murder in connection with the death of a convenience store employee during a
robbery in which he participated. See id. 17, 999 P.2d at 1087-88. At the post-examination
competency hearing, Hammon was found competent to stand trial. Id. 47, 999 P.2d at 1094.
Forensic psychologists reported that Hammon had an IQ of 67, but he was able to understand
the nature of the charges brought against him and was able to adequately assist his lawyer in the
preparation of his defense. Hammon v. State, 1995 OK CR 33, 47, 898 P.2d 1287, 1298-99
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faced the question of whether to uphold the death sentence of a mentally
retarded criminal. Rather than re-examine the court's established precedent
that banning capital punishment of the mentally retarded was a legislative
decision, the court upheld the conviction. °5 Likewise, in Pickens v. State,'0 6
the court declined to legislate for the citizens of Oklahoma, holding that under
current Oklahoma statutes, no legislative action existed that prevented the
State from seeking the death penalty against a person on the basis of his
mental retardation.
0 7
Dissenting in each of the aforementioned cases, Judge Chapel vehemently
questioned the decency of Oklahoma society in allowing mentally retarded
criminals to be sentenced to death.' He focused his reasoning on the
equivalent mental age of a retarded criminal, arguing that the execution of a
mentally retarded criminal with an IQ of 67, for example, is equivalent to
executing a nine-year-old.'0 9 In Hammon, Judge Chapel's push for abolishing
capital punishment of the mentally retarded was strengthened by Judge
Strubhar, who noted that a growing number of states had prohibited the
execution of mentally retarded criminals."0 Moreover, Judge Chapel
concluded that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals should address this
proposition rather than waiting for the legislature to do so."'
Recently, there was a strong push within the Oklahoma Legislature to pass
a bill that would ban capital punishment of all mentally retarded criminals.
In January 2001, legislators drafted Oklahoma House Bill No. 2635. The bill
prohibited capital punishment for mentally retarded criminals and outlined the
(Hammon 11).
105. Hammon 1, 91-95, 999 P.2d at 1101.
106. 2001 OK CR 3, 19 P.3d 866, post-conviction relief granted in part, denied in part,
2003 OK CR 16, 74 P.3d 601. In Pickens, the defendant was charged with first degree murder
in connection with the 1990 shooting death of a Sapulpa, Oklahoma convenience store
employee. Id. 12, 19 P.3d at 872. Pickens had robbed the convenience store and then shot the
employee four times. Id. Pickens was found competent to stand trial, despite the fact that
experts estimated that he had the mental capacity of a nine-year-old. Id. I 11, 19 P.3d at 887.
However, two years later Pickens was granted post-conviction relief based on the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Atkins. 2003 OK CR 161 11, 74 P.3d at 604. The Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the case for a jury determination regarding Pickens'
mental retardation claim. Id.
107. Id. 1 51, 19 P.3d at 883.
108. Pickens, 1 1-13, 19 P.3d at 884-88 (Chapel, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part);
Hammon 1, t 1-2, 999 P.2d at 1102-03 (Chapel, J., dissenting); Lambert 1, 11 1-11, 984 P.2d
at 240-44 (Chapel, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
109. Pickens, 11, 19 P.3d at 887 (Chapel, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
110. Hammon 4 12, 999 P.2d at 1102 (Stubhar, J., dissenting).
111. Id. 12, 999 P.2d at 1102-03 (Chapel, J., dissenting).
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procedure to determine whether a person was mentally retarded. 1 This
procedure would include a pretrial hearing at which time the defendant would
have to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he has "significantly sub-
average general intellectual functioning, significant limitations in adaptive
functioning, and that mental retardation was manifested before the age of
eighteen.""' 3 Despite successfully passing both the House and the Senate,
Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating vetoed the bill on June 7, 2002."' In
support of his veto, Governor Keating stated that Oklahoma "already has laws
which protect developmentally disabled persons from being executed.""' 5
Governor Keating's statement finds support in the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeal's decisions, which hold that if a person is unable to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her acts, such person cannot be
convicted or punished for a crime." 6 The sentiments expressed by those in
support of House Bill 2635 came to fruition in Atkins, a case that the U.S.
Supreme Court decided less than one month after Governor Keating vetoed
the bill.
V. Statement of the Case - Atkins v. Virginia
A. Facts
On August 16, 1996, Daryl Renard Atkins "spen[t] [his] day drinking
alcohol and smoking marijuana.""' 7 Around midnight, Atkins met up with
William Jones." 8 The two men, armed with semiautomatic handguns,
intended to rob a customer at a convenience store. "9 It was at the convenience
store that Atkins and Jones found their victim, Eric Nesbitt. 2 The men first
robbed Nesbitt of the money that he had on his person and then forced him to
112. H.B. 2635, 48th Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2001). See Appendix A for the full text of the
bill, as introduced by Representative Opio Toure of Oklahoma City.
113. Id. § 1(c).
114. Oklahoma Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty, supra note 94. "House Bill 2635
passed by a 53-46 vote in the House on May 23, [2002] and by a 25-16 vote in the Senate on
May 24, [2002]." Id.
115. http://www.ocadp.org/news/2002/HB2635_update.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2004).
116. Hammon 1, 2000 OK CR 7, 92, 999 P.2d at 1101; Davis v. State, 1995 OK CR 5,
13, 888 P.2d 1018, 1022; Smith v. State, 1982 OK CR 77, 1 12, 646 P.2d 1285, 1288; see also
21 OKLA. STAT. § 152 (2001). In this instance, it appears that Governor Keating, like many, has
erroneously assumed that all mentally retarded individuals suffer from a mental illness. See
supra note 54 and accompanying text.
117. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 338 (2002) (Atkins 1) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at307.
119. Id. at 307, 338.
120. ld. at 338.
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drive to an automatic teller machine where they compelled him to withdraw
an additional $200. 121
Despite Nesbitt's repeated pleas to be released unharmed, Atkins and Jones
drove him to a deserted area where Atkins ordered Nesbitt out of the
vehicle.' 22 Nesbitt had only walked a few feet from the vehicle when Atkins
shot him eight times.' 23 Nesbitt was hit "in the thorax, chest, abdomen, arms,
and legs."'' 24 He died at the scene.'25
B. Procedural History
At trial, Atkins "was convicted of abduction, armed robbery, and capital
murder."' 26 He was sentenced to death. 27 During the penalty phase of the
trial, the State of Virginia focused upon "victim impact evidence" to prove
both the "'vileness of the offense"' and the risk of Atkins' future
dangerousness to society.' 28 The State introduced to the jury that Atkins had
sixteen prior felony convictions, the majority of which were violent crimes. ' 29
Additionally, four of his previous victims testified as to the graphic nature of
his "violent tendencies."'30
The defense relied upon evidence from a forensic psychologist, who stated
that Atkins' full-scale IQ score of 59 categorized him as being "mildly
mentally retarded."' 3 ' The psychologist described Atkins as a "slow learner,"
121. Id. at 307, 338.
122. Id. at 338 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
123. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
124. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
125. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 510 S.E.2d 445,450 (Va. 1999), rev'd, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
126. Id. at 307; see VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (Michie Supp. 2003) (defining capital murder
and punishment).
127. Atkins I, 536 U.S. at 309; see VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 2000) (specifying
"[c]onditions for imposition of the death sentence").
128. Atkins 1, 536 U.S. at 308. To prove the vileness of the offense, the State introduced into
evidence pictures of the deceased and an autopsy report. Id. In proving the future
dangerousness factor, "the State relied on Atkins' prior felony convictions as well as the
testimony [from] victims" of Atkins' past crimes. Id.
129. Id. at 339 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Atkins had been convicted of robbery, attempted
robbery, abduction, use of a firearm and maiming. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). One victim described how Atkins hit him over the head with
a beer bottle. Another victim described how Atkins used his gun to slap another in the face.
A third victim told the story of Atkins hitting her in the head with a gun, which knocked her to
the ground. Atkins then proceeded to help her up, but only so that he could shoot her in the
stomach. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 308-09. Atkins "had a verbal IQ score of 64 and a performance IQ score of 60."
Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312, 319 n.8 (Va. 2000), rev'd, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
It should also be pointed out that Dr. Nelson, who administered the IQ test to Atkins, stated that
his score would likely be two to three points higher if Atkins had not been suffering from
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whose "capacity ... to conform his conduct to the law" was "impaired. '132
The psychologist further stated that Atkins' limited mental capacity "had been
a consistent feature throughout his life."'' 33
However, a second psychologist testified that no evidence outside of
Atkins' IQ score indicated that he "'was in the least bit mentally retarded.'" 3
Instead, the psychologist deemed Atkins to be suffering from antisocial
personality disorder.'35 Consequently, the jury sentenced Atkins to death. 36
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, Atkins argued that because he
was mentally retarded, he could not be sentenced to death. 37 A majority of
the court was not persuaded by this argument and denied Atkins' request to
have his death sentence commuted to life imprisonment. 138 The court was
unwilling to reduce the sentence to life imprisonment merely because Atkins
suffered from a mild degree of mental retardation. 39 The U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari 40 to address the constitutionality of capital punishment for
the mentally retarded in light of stronger evidence of a national consensus
against such punishment than was present in Penry.4'
depression. Id. at 319.
132. Id. at 338 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 309 n.5. Dr. Nelson also testified that Atkins' IQ score of 59 was "not an
'aberration, malingered result, or invalid test score."' Id.
134. Id. at 338-39 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 309. An individual suffering from antisocial personality disorder "engages in
deviant behaviour with lack of remorse." Antisocial Personality Disorder, http://medical-
dictionary.com (Jan. 13, 1998). An expert for the Commonwealth of Virginia, Dr. Stanton
Samenow, based his conclusion on two interviews with Daryl Atkins, a review of Atkins' high
school records, and interviews with correctional staff. Id. at 309 n.6. He accredited Atkins'
extremely poor academic performance "to the fact that he 'is a person who chose to pay
attention sometimes, not to pay attention others, and did poorly because he did not want to do
what he was required to do."' Id. at 310 n.529. However, Dr. Samenow did not administer an
intelligence test. Id. at 309 n.6.
136. Id. at 309; see also Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312, 321 (Va. 2000)
(indicating that the court was "not willing to commute Atkins' sentence of death to life
imprisonment merely because of his IQ score"), rev'd, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (Atkins 11).
137. Atkins I, 536 U.S. at 318.
138. Id. at 321.
139. See id.
140. Atkins v. Virginia, 534 U.S. 809 (2001).
141. See Atkins , 536 U.S. at 307. The Supreme Court had granted certiorari in McCarver
v. North Carolina, but subsequently remanded the case to state court. See supra note 2 and
accompanying text.
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C. Holding
The U.S. Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, held that mentally retarded
criminals should be categorically excluded from capital punishment.'42 The
Court stated that it did not believe that the dual purposes of the death
penalty - deterrence and retribution - could be served through the execution
of mentally retarded criminals. 4 ' In reaching this conclusion, the Court
examined the "standards of decency" model for criminal punishment
encompassed in the Eighth Amendment and the evolution of those
standards. "4
D. Majority Reasoning
The Court began its Eighth Amendment analysis by stating that the
constitutional limitation on criminal punishment "prohibits all excessive
punishments, as well as cruel and unusual punishments that may or may not
be excessive."'4  According to the majority, the determination of
"excessiveness" must be made in the context of society's "evolving standards
of decency."'46 The Court explained that a proportionality review of the
evolving standards of decency should be derived from objective factors, the
most clear and reliable being enacted legislation.'47
The Court next embarked upon a review of the various state legislatures
that have addressed the appropriateness of inflicting the death penalty upon
mentally retarded criminals. 4 s The Court also noted that in 1988, when
Congress reinstated the federal death penalty, it specifically prohibited the
execution of mentally retarded criminals. "' Furthermore, Congress retained
this provision when it expanded the federal death penalty law in 1994. 5'
142. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318 (The majority consisted of Justices Stevens, O'Connor,
Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg. Dissenting from the majority were Justices Scalia, Rehnquist,
and Thomas.).
143. Id. at 321.
144. Id. at311-17.
145. Id. at311 n.7.
146. Id. at311-12.
147. Id. at 312; see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000 (1991); Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002);
Rummell v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1980).
148. Atkins1, 536 U.S. at 313-17.
149. Id. at 314; see Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 21 U.S.C. § 848(t) (2000) (stating that
"[a] sentence of death shall not be carried out upon a person who is mentally retarded").
150. Atkins 1, 536 U.S. at 314 n.10; see Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §
3596(c) (2000).
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The majority reasoned that because of the Court's decision in Penry and the
subsequent federal death penalty legislation by Congress, many state
legislatures had enacted statutes forbidding capital punishment of the mentally
retarded.15 Rather than focusing on the mere number of states that had
enacted such legislation, the majority opted to examine "the consistency of the
direction of change."'5 The majority further reasoned that because more and
more states were enacting legislation against executing the mentally retarded,
there was "powerful evidence" supporting the conclusion that "society views
mentally retarded [criminals] as categorically less culpable than the average
criminal."'
Having established its belief that a national consensus had developed
against executing the mentally retarded, the majority next examined whether
imposing capital punishment on mentally retarded criminals serves the dual
purposes of the death penalty: deterrence and retribution.'54 The majority then
analyzed the AAMR's definition of mental retardation and reasoned that
because of their diminished capacity, mentally retarded people often act on
impulses rather than through predetermined planning and are extremely
susceptible to following the lead of others in a group setting. 5 The Court
reasoned that although they may not be more likely to actually engage in
criminal conduct than people of average intelligence, mentally retarded
individuals are not able to control their impulses to commit crime.'56 The
majority stated that this fact should not spare mentally retarded people from
criminal punishment.5 7 However, the Court stated that this fact demonstrated
that a mentally retarded criminal does not have the personal culpability of an
ordinary person who commits a crime."'
The majority initially reasoned that this lack of personal culpability
prevents a mentally retarded criminal from actually understanding the
"retribution" aspect of being sentenced to death.'59 Therefore, the Court held
that one social purpose of the death penalty, retribution, is not applicable in
the case of a mentally retarded criminal. 6 ° Second, the majority examined
151. Atkins 1, 536 U.S. at 314; see supra note 93.
152. Atkins I, 536 U.S. at 315.
153. Id. at 315-16. In further support of its conclusion, the majority "noted that the
legislatures that have addressed [this] issue have voted overwhelmingly in favor of the
prohibition." Id. at 316.
154. Id. at 319.
155. Id. at 318; see supra note 59.
156. Atkins I, 536 U.S. at 318.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 319.
160. Id.
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whether the death penalty serves as a deterrent to a mentally retarded person
committing a serious crime.' 61 Once again, the majority pointed out that "the
same cognitive and behavioral impairments that make [a] mentally retarded
[criminal] less ... culpable also make [him] less likely" to understand the
severity of execution as a form of punishment. 162 Therefore, the Court held
that the second social purpose of the death penalty - deterrence - also did
not apply to mentally retarded criminals.
63
E. Dissent Reasoning
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas,
focused on the majority's determination that a national consensus exists
against administering capital punishment to the mentally retarded."6 To the
dissenters, it appeared that the majority had arrived at its opinion through a
subjective rather than objective analysis of the evolving standards of decency.
Chief Justice Rehnquist strongly criticized the majority's decision to consider
foreign laws, the views of professional and religious organizations, and
opinion polls in determining the modem standards of decency in the United
States. 165
The dissenters argued that in determining "whether a [criminal] punishment
is 'cruel and unusual' under the evolving standards of decency, [the Court
had] emphasized that legislation is 'the clearest and most reliable objective
evidence of contemporary values."" 66 Furthermore, Chief Justice Rehnquist
stated that only two sources - the work product of legislatures and
sentencing-jury determinations - ought to be given weight in gauging the
American standards of decency for the purpose of Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence.1 67
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent also attacked the majority's use of
opinion poll data to determine evolving standards of decency. 168 He pointed
161. Id. at 319-20.
162. Id. at 320.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 321 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,
377 (1989) ("[Pletitioners seek to demonstrate [a consensus against capital punishment for
sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders] through other indicia, including public opinion polls,
the views of interest groups, and the positions adopted by various professional associations. We
decline the invitation to rest constitutional law upon such uncertain foundations.").
166. Atkins 1, 536 U.S. at 322-23 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989))
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987).
167. Atkins 1, 536 U.S. at 322-24 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see, e.g., Enmund v. Florida,
458 U.S. 782, 793-94 (1982).
168. Atkins I, 536 U.S. at 325-26 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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out the numerous possibilities for error that exist through the use of such
sampling techniques. 169 Additionally, he observed that none of the opinion
polls divulged the target survey population or the sampling techniques used
in the survey. 70 In conclusion, Justice Rehnquist condemned opinion poll
evidence as highly unreliable in establishing evolving standards of decency.171
Justice Scalia's dissent centered on his belief that the majority's opinion
had no basis in the text or history of the Eighth Amendment and likewise no
support in "current social attitudes" regarding the imposition of capital
punishment on mentally retarded criminals.'72 Justice Scalia noted that under
the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, a punishment is cruel and
unusual if it either (1) would have been considered cruel and unusual at the
time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights or (2) is inconsistent with modem
"standards of decency," as determined through objective indicators. 17 3
Justice Scalia began his analysis by pointing out that the majority never
argued that execution of the mildly mentally retarded would have been
deemed cruel and unusual in 1791.174 Next, he analyzed the second factor in
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence - the evolving standards of decency. He
noted that until this decision, the Court had focused on objective factors rather
than the subjective views of the Justices in determining the modem standards
of decency.'"5
In reasoning that the majority failed to base its decision on objective
factors, Justice Scalia emphasized that less than half (47%) of the thirty-eight
states that permit capital punishment have enacted legislation barring the
execution of the mentally retarded.'76 He then discredited the majority's
169. Id. at 326 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see infra note 237.
170. Atkins 1, 536 U.S. at 326 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 328 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Furthermore, Chief Justice Rehnquist found
the use of such opinion poll data to be a serious mistake when performing an analysis for the
establishment of a national consensus. Accordingly, he clearly demonstrated his disapproval
by not only writing a dissenting opinion in Atkins, but also by failing to state that he
"respectfully" dissented. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 337-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 339-40 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 341 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
175. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989);
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
176. Atkins 1, 536 U.S. at 342 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia claimed that of the
eighteen states that have barred the execution of mentally retarded criminals, over half of the
states have passed the legislation within the last eight years. Id. at 344 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia argued that, given the infancy of the legislation in the respective states, the states
have had insufficient experience under the statutes and thus are not capable of knowing whether
the legislation is a sensible law. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia noted that "[i]t is
'myopic to base sweeping constitutional principles upon the narrow experience of [a few]
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argument that it is not just the number of states that have enacted legislation,
but instead that the important evidence is the direction of the change.177
Justice Scalia concluded his dissent by criticizing the majority's reasoning
that the death penalty is an excessive punishment for mentally retarded
criminals.'78 He stated, "[S]urely culpability, and deservedness of the most
severe retribution, depends not merely ... upon the mental capacity of the
criminal... but also upon the depravity of the crime .... ."' Furthermore,
Justice Scalia questioned why a mentally retarded criminal who does know
right from wrong cannot be adequately assessed by a sentencer, who can then
determine whether the criminal's "retardation reduces his culpability enough
to exempt him from the death penalty."'8 0
VI. Analysis
A. No Support in the Text or History of the Eighth Amendment
The text of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states,
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted."'81 As is evident, the actual text of the
Amendment does not provide any analytical framework for assessing whether
capital punishment for mentally retarded criminals is constitutional. However,
it must be noted that its text does not on its face prohibit punishment of those
individuals who are mentally retarded, nor does it expressly prohibit capital
punishment as a constitutional form of punishment. Therefore, an analysis of
this issue relies on both the interpretation of the constitutional language by the
Supreme Court and the intent of the Framers who drafted the Bill of Rights.
In its interpretation of the terms "cruel and unusual punishment," the
Supreme Court has categorized punishment as cruel and unusual if it would
have been considered cruel and unusual at the time the Bill of Rights was
adopted or if it violates the modem standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.'8 2 This section of the analysis will focus on
the forms of punishment that were considered cruel and unusual at the time of
years."' Id. (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 614 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
177. Atkins 1, 536 U.S. at 344 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For more on consistency-of-the-
direction-of-change argument, see infra Part V.B.
178. Id. at 349-52 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 350 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 351 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
181. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
182. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986); see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
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the Bill of Rights, while section B will address the modem standards of
decency.
In Atkins, the Court failed to establish any argument in support of the view
that capital punishment of "mildly" mentally retarded criminals would have
been considered "cruel and unusual" to the Framers of the Constitution, who
drafted the Bill of Rights in 1791. 83 At common law, those people deemed
to be "severely or profoundly" mentally retarded were labeled "idiots" and as
such were not held accountable for their criminal actions.'84 An idiot was
defined as an individual who had a total lack of reason or understanding or an
inability to distinguish between good and evil." 5 The IQ of an idiot was
usually found to be at or below 25, which under modem standards would be
considered severe mental retardation.8 6 It was these "idiots" for whom the
common law barred the infliction of capital punishment, mainly on the basis
that they were unable to recognize the wrongfulness in their actions.'87
According to Blackstone, "a total idiocy ... excuses from the guilt, and of
course from the punishment, of any criminal action committed when under
such depravation of the senses."'88 This common law prohibition against
punishing idiots became the basis for the modem day insanity defense.'89
Atkins, however, did not raise the defense of insanity, rendering the
presumptive conclusion that Atkins' counsel did not feel that he was in any
way insane.
The quandary that developed at common law was in determining whether
an individual was actually an "idiot," and thus not subject to criminal
punishment, or whether he was merely an "imbecile."' 9° An imbecile suffered
from a lesser form of mental retardation in that the individual actually
183. Atkins 1, 536 U.S. at 340 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
184. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24-*25; see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302, 331-33 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
185. Penry, 492 U.S. at 333; see AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY, CLASSIFICATION IN
MENTAL RETARDATION 179 (Herbert J. Grossman ed., 1983) [hereinafter CLASSIFICATION].
186. CLASSIFICATION, supra note 185, at 9.
187. Penry, 492 U.S. at 333; see also Ford, 477 U.S. at 422 (noting that someone who is
"unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are about to suffer it" cannot
be executed).
188. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 184, at *25.
189. Penry, 492 U.S. at 332. Today, the defense of insanity "generally includes 'mental
defect' as well as 'mental disease' as part of the legal definition of insanity." Id.; see, e.g.,
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1985) ("A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the
time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either
to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law.") (alteration in original).
190. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 340-41 (2002) (Atkins 1).
[Vol. 56:879
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol56/iss4/3
COMMENT
possessed some intellectual capacity, albeit less than the average citizen. 9 '
The line of demarcation that developed focused on
where a person shall be said to be so far deprived of his sense and
memory as not to have any of his actions imputed to him [idiot]: or
where notwithstanding some defects of this kind he still appears to
have so much reason and understanding as will make him
accountable for his actions [imbecile].1 92
Given the historical context of what was considered to be cruel and unusual
punishment for mentally deficient criminals, it can be concluded that an
individual with similar mental characteristics as Daryl Atkins would not have
been considered an idiot under the common law. First, Atkins' IQ score of 59
would categorize him as "mildly" mentally retarded, placing him significantly
above the IQ score of 25, which qualified an individual for "idiot" status under
the common law. Upon examining Atkins, a clinical psychologist determined
that he displayed "absolutely no evidence other than the IQ score . . .
indicating that [petitioner] was in the least bit mentally retarded. '" 93 In fact,
the psychologist testified that Atkins was "'of average intelligence, at
least."1 94
The most important evidence take from Atkins' psychological examinations
showed that he did, in fact, comprehend the wrongfulness of his actions. 95
Psychologists testified that his appreciation for "the criminal nature of his
conduct was impaired, but not destroyed,"' 96 making it clear that Atkins
possessed the necessary mental capability to conform to the law. Atkins knew
right from wrong when he planned the robbery of a convenience store patron,
kidnapped the patron, and executed his innocent victim. Therefore, under the
common law, it is more than likely that Atkins would have been labeled an
imbecile and would have been subject to the imposition of capital punishment
for the murder that he committed.
B. Lack of Objectivity in the Standards of Decency
Aside from what would be considered cruel and unusual punishment at the
time the Bill of Rights was drafted, the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence requires that criminal punishments be analyzed in the context
191. ISAAC RAY, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY 91 (W. Overholser ed., 1962).
192. ANTHONY HIGHMORE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF IDIOCY AND LUNACY 200 (1807).
193. Atkins 1, 536 U.S. at 338-39 (alteration in original) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
194. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
195. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312,319 (Va. 2000), rev'd, 536 U.S. 304(2002)
(Atkins 1).
196. Id.
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of the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society." 197  In determining these evolving standards, the Court has
vehemently stressed the importance of using objective indicators.'98 The
Court has clearly stated that in a democratic society, legislation passed by
elected representatives and sentencing juries consisting of American citizens
should be the sole factors considered in analyzing the modem standards of
decency.' 99
However, in Atkins, the majority paid little homage to this established
principle and instead subjectively reasoned that Atkins could not
constitutionally be sentenced to capital punishment by the State of Virginia.
The majority made this decision despite the fact that a jury of American
citizens had declared Atkins to be competent to stand trial and capable of
understanding his punishment. Furthermore, a jury had determined that his
mild mental retardation was not sufficient to spare Atkins from a death
sentence.2°°
In assessing the standards of decency under the Eighth Amendment, it is
imperative that the Court "'be informed by objective factors to the maximum
possible extent"' and that its decisions "'not be, or appear to be, merely the
subjective views of individual Justices. "'201 A true determination of which
standards have evolved and how far they have evolved can only be made by
society itself, as a whole, in the form of legislation. The federal system within
which the United States operates dictates that the Court's deference to the
views of the American people is not only appropriate, it is mandated. °2 The
question then becomes what evidence is most representative of the views of
society. According to established Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, an
analysis into the standards of decency for a maturing society must begin with
statutes passed by society's elected representatives, for it "will rarely if ever
be the case that the Members of this Court will have a better sense of the
197. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
198. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304 (2002); see Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-97 (1977).
199. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,794-96 (1982); see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815, 831 (1988) (plurality opinion).
200. Atkins II, 534 S.E.2d at 314.
201. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 341 (2002) (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 592) (Atkins
D.
202. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369-70 (1989); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 176 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("The deference we owe to the decisions of the state
legislatures under our federal system is enhanced where the specification of punishments is
concerned .... ") (citation omitted).
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evolution in views of the American people than do their elected
representatives. 2 3
In determining whether a punishment is "cruel and unusual" under the
Eighth Amendment, the voice of the American people as evidenced through
state legislation has been declared by the Court to be "[t]he clearest and most
reliable objective evidence of contemporary values."2" The Court has also
acknowledged that "'in a democratic society legislatures, not courts, are
constituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the
people.' 20  Additionally, specifications of punishment have long been held
to be "peculiarly questions of legislative policy," not determinations made by
a court making an ad hoc judgment concerning appropriate punishment for a
criminal. 6
Despite this clear and convincing preference for objectiveness, the Atkins
court chose to infuse a subjective element into its determination of the
evolving standards of decency. As a basis for its decision, the Court
concluded that a national consensus existed against capital punishment of
mentally retarded criminals. 27 According to the majority, "cases involving a
[national] consensus" require the individual Justices to pass judgment on the
consensus.0 ' Therefore, the Court first reviewed the basis of the national
consensus and then gave its reasons for agreeing or disagreeing with the
findings. 2' This approach unashamedly rid the analysis of its objectivity and
rendered the Court as final arbitrator.
The Court's conclusion that capital punishment of mentally retarded
criminals is cruel and unusual resulted primarily from the fact that eighteen
states had recently "passed laws limiting the death eligibility of certain
defendants based on mental retardation alone."2 ' However, given that thirty-
eight states allowed capital punishment, these eighteen states represented a
mere 47%, not a consensus by any stretch.21" ' Even more astonishing than a
203. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 865 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
204. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,331 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304 (2002).
205. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 175-76 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 383
(1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
206. Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958); see also Robinson v. California, 370
U.S 660, 664-65 (1962); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958) (plurality opinion).
207. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315-16 (2002) (Atkins 1).
208. Id. at 313.
209. Id. at 304.
210. Id. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (Georgia, Maryland, Kentucky, Tennessee, New
Mexico, Arkansas, Colorado, Washington, Indiana, Kansas, New York, Nebraska, South
Dakota, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Missouri, North Carolina).
211. Id. at 342 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The majority in Atkins failed to sufficiently argue that
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47% "consensus" was the fact that only seven states that had capital
punishment had banned its imposition on all mentally retarded criminals. 12
Consensus? Absolutely not. Given these statistics, it can be concluded that
the national consensus the majority claimed existed against capital punishment
for all mentally retarded criminals was supported by only 18% of the states
that have capital punishment. The Court's arrival at such a subjectively based
conclusion can only be described as a feeble attempt at arithmetic
manipulation and a blatant disregard for the concept of consensus.
Included in the Court's attempt at fabricating a national consensus was its
awkward analysis of the "margins by which state legislatures have enacted
bans on execution of the retarded."" 3 According to the Court, it is relevant to
an analysis of a national consensus to weigh not only how many states have
passed a certain form of legislation, but also how much support the legislation
had in its enactment.2" 4 Basically, this process boiled down to a "nose count"
of the number of Americans in each individual state who supported or
opposed the legislation." 5 Established Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
dictates that the determination of the evolution of the standards of decency
should be based upon the same framework of analysis as that which took place
when the Amendment itself was adopted.2" 6 This framework established that
a consensus is comprised of states, not of individual Americans.217 This
analysis is merely another example of the Court desperately searching for any
sort of concrete statistical evidence that could, in even the slightest way,
support its subjectively based decision.
Because of the weak statistical evidence of a national consensus, the
majority attempted to strengthen its position by placing significance not only
on the number of States that had passed legislation, but also on the
the number of states that have completely abandoned capital punishment should be included in
the count of states that do not execute mentally retarded criminals in establishing a national
consensus. Id. at 314. In Penry, however, the Court allowed states that did not have capital
punishment to be included in the analysis of whether a national consensus existed. Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). At
the time of Penry, even the addition of the states completely rejecting capital punishment did
not suffice to establish a consensus. Id. However, in Atkins, had the majority strongly pursued
the precedent in Penry, it could have argued that the twelve states that did not have capital
punishment at all, added to the eighteen states that had capital punishment but did not execute
the mentally retarded, would result in 60% of the states choosing not to sentence mentally
retarded criminals to death.
212. Atkins , 536 U.S. at 342 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 346 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
214. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
215. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
216. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
217. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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"consistency of the direction of change" that State legislatures had taken.21 8
However, given that fourteen years prior to Atkins every state that had the
death penalty allowed for execution of the mentally retarded, there was really
only one direction that state legislation could have gone.219 Therefore, the
conclusion from this evidence is that "'[n]o state has yet undone its exemption
of the mentally retarded.'" 212  Given this conclusion, the "consistency of the
direction of change" argument proposed by the Court had practically no
probative value in determining the evolving standards of decency.
The second objective indicator that the Court has identified as a
determinant for the evolving standards of decency is the decisions of
sentencing juries. Although Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has given less
weight to the actions of sentencing juries than to decisions of state
legislatures,22' the Court has stated that data concerning the actions of
sentencing juries remains "'a significant and reliable objective index of
contemporary values.' ' '222 Because the jury is so "intimately" involved in the
facts and circumstances surrounding the case before it, the jury serves a vital
function of "'maintain[ing] a link between contemporary community values
and the penal system." 23
By design, the purpose of a sentencing jury in a criminal proceeding is to
impose a "publicly acceptable" punishment.24 These jury determinations
alone have a strong tendency to show just how far the standards of decency
have evolved regarding criminal punishment. However, the Court, in reaching
its conclusion, failed to address the fact that no evidence had been presented
to support a finding that sentencing juries deem capital punishment to be a
disproportionate penalty for a mentally retarded criminal.225 In fact, experts
have estimated that close to 10% of all death row inmates are mentally
retarded, which suggests that sentencing juries have not been overly reluctant
to sentence mentally retarded criminals to death.226
218. Id. at 344 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
219. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 345 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 323 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596
(1977).
222. Coker, 433 U.S. at 596 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976)); see also
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 439-40 (1972).
223. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976) (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
510, 519 n.15 (1968)).
224. Atkins I, 536 U.S. at 324 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
225. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that "[a]pparently no
such statistics exist.". Id. at 324 n.*.
226. R. Bonner & S. Rimer, Executing the Mentally Retarded Even as Laws Begin to Shift,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2000, at Al.
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Despite the Court's inability to establish a legitimate objective basis for its
finding of a national consensus, it was able to muster some evidence - albeit
less than compelling in nature and anything but objective - to support its
finding of a national consensus. This evidence consisted of the laws of
foreign countries, public opinion polls, and the views of professional and
religious organizations.227 Although the Court creatively articulated its
reasoning as to why these forms of evidence were relevant, none of these
factors are appropriate when trying to determine whether there is a national
consensus against capital punishment for mentally retarded criminals.228
Therefore, it is difficult to characterize the Court's analysis of the standards
of decency performed as being motivated by anything other than the
subjective views of the Justices.
In support of its finding of a "national consensus," the Court stated that in
many prominent foreign countries, the "imposition of the death penalty for
crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly
disapproved." '229 Amazingly, given this statement, it appears the Court not
only struggled with the definition of the word "consensus," but it also had
difficulty deciphering the meaning of the word "national." If the Court were
actually looking to establish a national consensus against capital punishment
for mentally retarded criminals, then how could foreign laws enter into the
scope of relevancy?
Established Eighth Amendment precedent dictates that only American
ideals of decency regarding criminal punishment are "dispositive. "230
Although legislation imposed by foreign democracies may be relevant for
comparative purposes, foreign legislation cannot serve as evidence to establish
the Eighth Amendment requirement that a certain punishment coincide with
American citizens' view of decency.23' While the "climate of international
opinion" may serve to reinforce a conclusion by the Court that certain
standards of decency have evolved within the United States, "where there is
not first a settled consensus among our own people, the views of other nations,
however enlightened the Justices of this Court may think them to be, cannot
be imposed upon Americans through the Constitution. 232
227. Atkins 1, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21.
228. Id. at 322.
229. Id. at 316-17 n.21.
230. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989).
231. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,868-69 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see
also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395
U.S. 784 (1969).
232. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 868-69 n.4.
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Regardless of how "enlightened" the Court may have found the fact that
many foreign communities prohibit capital punishment of mentally retarded
criminals, each Justice in the majority must remember "that it is a constitution
[they] are expounding. ' 233 Furthermore, it is the U.S. Constitution that they
are expounding. Therefore, using the laws of foreign communities to establish
a national consensus of the American standards of decency not only
constituted a serious misinterpretation of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence,
but it was "antithetical to [the] considerations of federalism" upon which the
Constitution is based. 3
The second piece of unpersuasive evidence that the Court offered as proof
of a national consensus was public opinion poll data. According to this data,
an overwhelming number of Americans felt that capital punishment of
mentally retarded criminals was cruel or unusual punishment and thus
unconstitutional.235 Reliance upon such data is precarious however, because
of the many variations inherent in an opinion poll that may skew the results.236
Public opinion polls often produce unreliable and invalid data that results in
methodological errors and misguided inferences about how America as a
society actually feels about certain issues.237 There are three significant errors
in the public opinion poll data upon which the Court relied in establishing a
national consensus. These errors include the imprecise and broad categorical
nature of the questions, the lack of identification of the targeted survey
population, and the lack of evidence pertaining to why the surveys were
conducted and the manner in which they were conducted.238
The first methodological error evident in the public opinion poll data is that
the various opinion polls cited by the majority did not actually present
questions to respondents that were representative of the constitutional
question presented in Atkins. Most of the opinion poll questions took a broad
categorical approach to the issue of capital punishment for mentally retarded
criminals.2 39 For example, the question presented to respondents in North
Carolina and South Carolina asked, "'Should the Carolinas ban the execution
233. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
234. Atkins 1, 536 U.S. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (referring to the majority's use
of foreign laws, views of professional and religious organizations, and opinion polls as relevant
sources to the constitutional question of capital punishment for the mentally retarded).
235. Id. app. at 328 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 326 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
237. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
238. Atkins 1, 536 U.S. at 327 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
239. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing as an example, "Do you think that persons
convicted of murder who are mentally retarded should or should not receive the death
penalty?").
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of people with mental retardation?""'24 While this question would yield
accurate results pertaining to the issue of whether or not mentally retarded
criminals should be executed, it does not yield results that pertain to the
specific nature of the case in Atkins.
In Atkins, the issue before the Court was whether any criminal with any
level of mental retardation can ever, under any circumstances, act with the
requisite culpability for the imposition of the death penalty.241 With regard to
this issue, the questions in the opinion poll data submitted to the Court were
imprecise and categorically overbroad. A more accurate representation of
how American citizens view capital punishment for mentally retarded
criminals could have been obtained through a more precise question, such as:
Suppose you are sitting on a jury where the defendant has been
convicted of capital murder. The defendant has also been
determined to be mentally retarded. Given the following
circumstances, do you feel that the defendant should be sentenced
to capital punishment?
A. The defendant is mentally retarded, but he/she is deemed to
be culpable of the crime that he/she has committed, meaning that
at the time of the crime he/she did know the difference between
right and wrong.
B. The defendant is mentally retarded and is deemed not to be
culpable of the crime that he/she has committed, meaning that at
the time of the crime he/she did not know the difference between
right and wrong.
A survey using a question similar to this example would have given
researchers a more accurate pulse of how American citizens feel about
imposing a death sentence on a mentally retarded criminal. It is quite
240. Id. app. at 331 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). In response to this survey question, 64%
of citizens in North Carolina and South Carolina answered "yes," while 21% answered "no,"
and 14% answered "not sure." Id. A similar survey was conducted in Oklahoma in July 1999,
where citizens were asked the following categorically overbroad question: "Some people think
that persons convicted of murder who are mentally retarded (or who have a mental age of
between five and ten years) should not be executed. Other people think that 'retarded' persons
should be subject to the death penalty like anyone else. Which is closer to the way you feel, that
'retarded' persons should not be executed, or that 'retarded' persons should be subject to the
death penalty like everyone else?" Id. app. at 333-34 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). In response
to this survey question, 83.5% of Oklahomans responded that mentally retarded criminals
"should not be executed," while 10.8% responded that mentally retarded criminals "should be
executed;" 5.7% of the respondents answered that it "depends." Id. app. at 333 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
241. Id. at 327 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
[Vol. 56:879
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol56/iss4/3
COMMENT
probable that many of those participants in the surveys at issue might have
answered differently given a more precise question. For example, an
individual might have felt that because mental retardation hindered a
defendant's ability to determine right from wrong, capital punishment was not
appropriate. Therefore, that individual would have answered the survey by
opposing capital punishment for mentally retarded criminals. However, that
same individual might have felt that in some instances, such as those in which
mental retardation has not hindered a defendant's ability to determine right
from wrong, that capital punishment was appropriate.
The second methodological error evident in the opinion poll data is the lack
of the identification of the targeted survey population. Not even one of the
twenty-seven public opinion polls submitted to the Court offered a description
of the population of people surveyed.242 It is, therefore, impossible to
determine whether the sample was an adequate representation of the views of
the citizens in the individual state or the American public as a whole.
2 43
Therefore, the use of this public opinion poll data as support that a national
consensus existed against capital punishment for mentally retarded criminals
is unwarranted.
A third methodological error of the public opinion poll data was the lack
of evidence describing the purpose for which the surveys were conducted and
the manner in which they were administered. 244 These are two important
factors that speak to the objectivity of the survey itself. For example, suppose
the purpose of the survey was to support a state legislative bill that was
seeking to exclude mentally retarded criminals from capital punishment. In
this situation, a high probability exists that the people targeted by the survey
were likely to be in support of this legislation, which tends to reduce the
probative value of the opinion poll data when offered to show a consensus
among all people in a given geographic area. Likewise, the method in which
the survey was conducted could have had a bearing on the accuracy of the data
obtained. For example, if the survey was conducted via telephone by a
researcher who was in favor of the aforementioned legislation, there is a real
possibility that the researcher might have influenced the person to whom the
survey was being given. These risks of bias, while hypothetical in nature, are
two prime examples of how unreliable public opinion poll data can be in
establishing a consensus.
The final pieces of questionable evidence that the Court offered for proof
of a national consensus were the views of professional and religious
242. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
243. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
244. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
2003]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2003
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
organizations that believe mentally retarded criminals should not be subject
to capital punishment.245 The majority noted in its support of a national
consensus that "representatives of widely diverse religious communities...
reflecting Christian, Jewish, Muslim, and Buddhist traditions, . . . 'share a
conviction that the execution of persons with mental retardation cannot be
morally justified.' 24 6 Professional and religious organizations seek to serve
their own purposes when giving opinions on certain issues and can in no way
be representative of the views of American society.247 The majority's
willingness to adopt the views of interest groups indicates a total lack of
objectivity in the determination of whether a national consensus exists.
In a comprehensive analysis of the evidence put forth by the majority in
holding that capital punishment of mentally retarded criminals is contrary to
evolving standards of decency, one resounding theme seems to be apparent:
lack of objectivity. The majority completely disregarded the two objective
indicators of a national consensus - state legislation and sentencing jury
determinations. Instead it embarked on its own personal mission to establish
a national consensus in favor of its preferred ruling. This blatant abuse of
judicial power is obvious not only in the majority's interpretation of the
standards of decency but also in the majority's reasoning behind categorically
excluding all mentally retarded criminals from capital punishment.
C. Categorical Exclusion of Culpability
In prohibiting capital punishment of all mentally retarded criminals, the
Court essentially has concluded that no person who is in any way mentally
retarded possesses the requisite culpability for the imposition of a death
sentence.4' This overbroad holding encompasses the Court's reasoning that
because mentally retarded criminals have "diminished capacities," the
imposition of a death sentence on them should always be considered excessive
punishment under the Eighth Amendment.249 This ruling effectively deems
both judges and juries incapable of taking the mental retardation of the
defendant into account when deciding whether capital punishment is
warranted for a given crime. It is apparent from this decision that the Court
firmly believes that "'in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on
245. See id. at 316 n.21.
246. Id. (quoting Brief of Anici Curiae United States Catholic Conference et al. at 2,
McCarver v. North Carolina, 533 U.S. 975 (2001) (No. 00-8727)).
247. Id. at 347 n.6.
248. Id. at 306.
249. Id. at 306-07.
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the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth
Amendment.
250
The Court offered two rationales to support its conclusion that the death
penalty is an excessive punishment for all mentally retarded criminals: (1) that
the diminished capacity of a mentally retarded criminal poses a "'serious
question"' as to whether the imposition of a death sentence for such a criminal
actually serves the "'social purposes' of the death penalty"; 251 (2) the
diminished capacity of mentally retarded criminals exposes them to "'a special
risk of wrongful execution. '' 252 While both rationales may indeed have a
factual basis, the erroneous assumption underlying both is that all mentally
retarded people suffer from the same extent of diminished capacity.2 3
Therefore, to justify a ruling on the supposition that mentally retarded
criminals compose a homogenous group with similarly diminished capacities
lacks discernment.
Three main flaws in the Court's reasoning must be analyzed in regard to
this categorical exclusion of the mentally retarded from capital punishment.
First, it is erroneous to conclude that the social purposes of capital punishment
can never be furthered through the execution of a mentally retarded
criminal.254 Second, it is the role of the judge and the jury to determine
whether a mentally retarded criminal has the requisite culpability for a death
sentence.255 Finally, the risk of a mentally retarded criminal being wrongfully
executed does not warrant a categorical exclusion from capital punishment for
all mentally retarded criminals.256
Based on Eighth Amendment precedent, the Court correctly identified the
two social purposes of the death penalty - retribution and deterrence.257
According to the Court, "[u]nless the imposition of the death penalty on a
250. Id. at 312 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977)) (emphasis added).
251. Id. at 350 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
252. Id. at 352 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia referred to the majority's argument that
the death penalty may be imposed against a mentally retarded criminal "'in spite of factors
which may call for a less severe penalty."' Id. at 320 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
605 (1978)).
253. See id. at 317 ("Not all people who claim to be mentally retarded will be so impaired
as to fall within the range of mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a national
consensus.").
254. Id. at 319.
255. Id. at 349 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is very difficult to define the indivisible line that
defines perfect and partial insanity; but it must rest upon circumstances duly to be weighed and
considered both by the judge and jury, lest on the one side there be a kind of inhumanity
towards the defects of human nature, or on the other side too great an indulgence given to great
crimes .. ") (quoting 1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 30 (1736) (alterations in original)).
256. Id. at 352 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
257. Id. at 305; see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion).
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mentally retarded person 'measurably contributes to one or both of these
goals, it is ... an unconstitutional punishment. "258 The goal of retribution is
based on the theory that capital punishment is a way for society to express its
"moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct., 259 Deterrence, on the other
hand, focuses on the interest of states in preventing capital crimes by
prospective offenders.260
The Court incorrectly concluded that capital punishment of mentally
retarded criminals does not further the social policy of retribution. It reasoned
that retribution is not served by the death penalty because the mentally
retarded criminal is no more culpable than the average criminal who has
committed a capital crime. 26' This reasoning was founded on the assumption
that mentally retarded persons, because of their diminished capacity or
"childlike" minds, are more likely to willfully commit serious crimes than the
average person.262 Is there really rational scientific evidence with which one
can prove that a person with a "childlike" mind who commits a brutal murder
is no more culpable than a person who commits a "run-of-the-mill" domestic
dispute murder?2 6
3
Included in an analysis of retribution must be some consideration of the
nature of the crime committed. In the case of a mentally retarded criminal, the
sentencing jury has traditionally weighed both the degree of the defendant's
mental retardation and the depravity of the crime. The Court's categorical
ruling that no mentally retarded criminal possesses the requisite culpability for
capital punishment prohibits this "weighing of the circumstances., 265 This
determination is an important part of the process in capital cases because "the
decision that capital punishment may be the appropriate sanction in extreme
cases is an expression of the community's belief that certain crimes are
themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response
258. Atkins I, 536 U.S. at 319 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)
(internal quotes omitted)).
259. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183; see also Enmund, 458 U.S. at 799 ("[I]t seems likely that
'capital punishment can serve as a deterrent only when murder is the result of premeditation and
deliberation .... ') (quoting Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 484 (1946) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting)).
260. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798; see also Atkins 1, 536 U.S. at 320 ("The theory of deterrence
in capital sentencing is predicated upon the notion that the increased severity of the punishment
will inhibit criminal actors from carrying out murderous conduct.").
261. Atkins 1, 536 U.S. at 350 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
262. Id. at 350-51 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
263. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
264. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
265. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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may be the penalty of death., 266 Given that sentencing juries continue to
impose capital punishment on mentally retarded criminals in extreme cases,
clear evidence demonstrates that American society is sometimes so outraged
at the crime that it feels the death penalty is a proper form of retribution for
the mentally retarded criminal.267
The Court itself has admitted that mental retardation does not always render
a criminal "morally blameless." '268 Therefore, there is no actual basis to
conclude that capital punishment can never serve the purpose of retribution for
a mentally retarded criminal.269 If a mentally retarded criminal knows the
difference between right and wrong yet makes the decision to commit a
heinous crime, society needs to express its moral outrage and exact retribution
for the harm that the criminal has done to it.
Turning attention to the second social purpose for capital punishment,
deterrence, the Court again based its categorical exclusion of mentally
retarded criminals on faulty assumptions. According to the Court, deterrence
is not advanced because a mentally retarded criminal is not as likely as a "non-
retarded" criminal to "process the information of the possibility of execution
as a penalty and ... control [his] conduct based upon that information. "270
This conclusion is based on the assumption that because mentally retarded
criminals are less deterred, they are, as a group, more likely to commit a
capital offense.27" ' However, given the language of the majority - "more
likely" - it would appear that the Court is reluctant to conclude that mentally
retarded criminals can ever be deterred from committing crimes because of the
presence of capital punishment.272
As with the social purpose of retribution, the Court erred in categorically
excluding mentally retarded criminals from the death penalty based on its
fallacious assumption that none of them can be deterred from crime by a
capital punishment statute. The fact that some mentally retarded criminals
cannot fully comprehend and appreciate the seriousness of a death sentence
does not necessarily mean that no mentally retarded criminal can comprehend
and appreciate capital punishment.273 If a state death penalty statute succeeds
in dissuading even a portion of mentally retarded persons from committing
266. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184 (1976) (plurality opinion).
267. Atkins 1, 536 U.S. at 350-51 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
268. Id. at 351 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
269. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
270. Id. at 320.
271. Id. at 351 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
272. Id. at 351-52 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
273. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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capital crimes, then does it not, by definition, serve the purpose of
deterrence?274
A second flaw inherent in the categorical exclusion of the mentally retarded
from capital punishment is that judges and juries are no longer permitted to
determine objectively whether a mentally retarded criminal has the requisite
culpability to warrant a death sentence. In essence, this categorical exclusion
proscribes a jury from deciding whether a mentally retarded criminal knew
right from wrong at the time the crime was committed.275 Rather, a categorical
exclusion ignores any individualized determination of the effect that mental
retardation had on a defendant's criminal activity.276 According to the Court,
neither judges nor sentencing juries are able "to account properly for the
'diminished capacities' of the retarded." '277 This line of reasoning begs the
question: If notjudges orjuries, then who is capable of "accounting properly"
for the diminished capacity of a mentally retarded person? In short, by
proclaiming mental retardation to be an absolute barrier to capital punishment,
the Court has answered: the Supreme Court.
Before the Atkins decision, many states allowed mental retardation to be
considered by the sentencing jury as a mitigating factor, thus permitting the
jury to consider both the diminished mental capacity of the criminal and the
severity of the crime that he committed.27 These factors, weighed together,
allowed the sentencing jury to make an individualized determination of
whether the criminal defendant was able to distinguish between right and
wrong at the time the crime was committed.279 This process firmly adhered
to established Eighth Amendmentjurisprudence. In Furman v. Georgia,"' the
Court held that "in order to minimize the risk that the death penalty would be
imposed on a capriciously selected group of offenders, the decision to impose
it had to be guided by standards so that the sentencing authority would focus
on the particularized circumstances of the crime and the defendant.""28
Furthermore, in Penry, the Court noted that "it is precisely because the
274. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
275. Id. at 351 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
276. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 337-38 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304 (2002).
277. Atkins 1, 536 U.S. at 349 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia also noted that "[tihe...
inability of judges or juries to take proper account of mental retardation - is not only
unsubstantiated, but contradicts the immemorial belief, here and in England, that they play an
indispensable role in such matters." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
278. Penry, 492 U.S. at 337 n.2.
279. Atkins 1, 536 U.S. at 350-51 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
280. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
281. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976) (plurality opinion) (discussing the holding
of Furman).
[Vol. 56:879
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol56/iss4/3
COMMENT
punishment should be directly related to the personal culpability of the
defendant that the jury must be allowed to consider and give effect to
mitigating evidence relevant to a defendant's character or record or the
circumstances of the offense. 282 The Court has even stated that the Eighth
Amendment "mandates an individualized assessment of the appropriateness
of the death penalty."
283
In Penry, the Court recognized that a defendant's mental retardation may
decrease his culpability for a capital crime.28 4 However, the Court was
unwilling to interpret the Eighth Amendment to categorically exclude
criminals with any form of mental retardation from being sentenced to death
based on their mental retardation alone.28 5 Instead, the Court held that "[s]o
long as sentencers can consider and give effect to mitigating evidence of
mental retardation in imposing sentence, an individualized determination
whether 'death is the appropriate punishment' can be made in each particular
case." 286 Despite the precedent established in Penry, the Atkins court chose
to focus more on a "death is different" theory of capital punishment, rather
than on the "death is appropriate" theory of capital punishment.2 7
As a result of Atkins, sentencing juries can no longer make an
individualized assessment of whether capital punishment is appropriate
because the jury will have to consider the diminished capacity of the criminal
defendant apart from the facts surrounding the crime. In cases where capital
punishment is appropriate, mental retardation is no longer a mitigating
factor - it is an absolute barrier to a death sentence. Therefore, a sentencing
jury that deems a criminal defendant to be even minutely mentally retarded
will be precluded from imposing a sentence of capital punishment, regardless
of the facts of the case. This conclusion calls into question the vital role of the
jury in a capital case as the "trier of fact."28
282. Penry, 492 U.S. at 327-28.
283. Id. at 317.
284. Id. at 340.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 337-38 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Atkins I). In
Penry, the Court focused more on whether death is an appropriate sentence for an individual
defendant given the fact that mitigating evidence pointed to the defendant being mentally
retarded. Penry, 492 U.S. at 340. In contrast, the Atkins Court focused more on whether
mentally retarded criminals as a group should be treated differently regarding the death penalty
because it is a "different" form of punishment. Atkins 1, 536 U.S. at 337 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
288. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447,480 (1984); see also McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
279, 310 n.32 (1987) (discussing a jury's "broad discretion" in a capital case, as recognized by
the Court in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968)). In Witherspoon, "[t]he Court
expressly recognized that the purpose of the 'broad discretion' given to a sentencing jury is 'to
decide whether or not death is "the proper penalty" in a given case,' noting that 'a juror's
20031
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A final flaw inherent in the categorical exclusion of the mentally retarded
from capital punishment is that the risk of wrongful execution does not
warrant the uncompromising wholesale exclusion of mentally retarded
criminals. The Court reasoned that the reduced capacity of the mentally
retarded enhances the possibility of false confessions, renders them less
helpful to their counsel, hinders them from testifying well, and creates in their
demeanor the impression that they lack remorse.289 While all of these risks are
valid, they are equally possible in the prosecution of capital crimes where the
defendant is not mentally retarded. Similarly, these risks are apparent in all
criminal prosecutions of mentally retarded criminals, not only in capital cases.
For example, suppose the defendant is not mentally retarded by definition,
but suffers from an antisocial personality disorder that makes him particularly
inarticulate. An inarticulate defendant may very well have conveyed
information to authorities that the prosecution has deemed a confession, when
in fact the defendant did not intend to confess. Likewise, a defendant
suffering from antisocial personality disorder may not testify well on the stand
and may not be able to clearly express important information to counsel.
Furthermore, if the antisocial defendant does not eloquently express remorse
at a sentencing hearing, the jury may interpret his stoicism to be a lack of
remorse and take that into consideration in imposing a sentence. Would it
then be appropriate to say that all capital defendants who are neither insane
nor mentally retarded should be categorically excluded from capital
punishment on the basis that they suffer from antisocial personality disorder?
Given the nature of these "special risks" identified by the Court, it is logical
to assume that these risks are apparent not only when mentally retarded
criminals face capital sentences, but also in every other criminal prosecution
against a mentally retarded offender. The identification of these special risks
further illustrates the intent of the Atkins Court to focus on the "death is
different" doctrine.29° For example, suppose that a mentally retarded person
has committed rape. A mentally retarded person may confess to the crime
when in reality he did not commit the crime. Likewise, a mentally retarded
defendant may be less able to give meaningful assistance to counsel than a
nonretarded defendant. Furthermore, if the mentally retarded defendant does
not testify well at trial, his lack of rhetorical skill could add to his risk of being
wrongfully convicted. It is also very possible that if the mentally retarded
defendant is convicted of rape, the jury may misconceive that he lacks
remorse. Would it then be appropriate to say that mentally retarded criminals
general views about capital punishment play an inevitable role in any such decision."'
McClesky, 481 U.S. at 310 n.32.
289. Atkins I, 536 U.S. at 320-21.
290. Id. at 337-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see supra note 286 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 56:879
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol56/iss4/3
COMMENT
who are convicted of rape cannot be sentenced to the maximum allowable
punishment?
The Court's conclusion that mentally retarded criminals are more
susceptible to receiving harsher sentences than the crime warrants should be
phrased as a Due Process claim rather than an Eighth Amendment claim.29" '
The Supreme Court has "never before held it to be cruel and unusual
punishment to impose a sentence in violation of some other constitutional
imperative."'2 92 There are risks inherent in every judicial proceeding, not just
capital cases and notjust proceedings involving mentally retarded defendants.
Therefore, a categorical exclusion of every group of people who may be at
risk of a wrongful conviction or even a wrongful execution would render our
criminal justice system unworkable.
The Supreme Court's decision to categorically exclude mentally retarded
criminals from capital punishment is purely a reflection of the personal views
of those justices who sat on the majority in Atkins. This decision lacked
support not only from the original intent of the Framers of the Eighth
Amendment and prior judicial interpretations of the Amendment, but also
from the moral beliefs of American society. By acting as a legislature for the
American people, these Justices substituted their own personal views for those
of elected state legislators. To quote an old clich6, "only time will tell" what
impact the Supreme Court's decision in Atkins will have, but one thing is
certain: the Court failed to articulate a sound constitutional basis upon which
to justify its decision.
VII. The Aftermath of Atkins
A. Federal Impact
The Supreme Court's decision in Atkins will not affect federal cases wherein
a mentally retarded criminal has committed a serious crime. Congress originally
outlawed capital punishment of the mentally retarded in all federal cases through
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.293 The Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994
reinforced this prohibition against sentencing the mentally retarded to death.2"
Despite the fact that both statutes assert that capital punishment will not be
291. Id. at 352 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
292. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
293. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
294. Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c) (2000) ("A sentence of death
shall not be carried out upon a person who is mentally retarded. A sentence of death shall not
be carried out upon a person who, as a result of mental disability, lacks the mental capacity to
understand the death penalty and why it was imposed on that person.").
2003]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2003
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
administered against any person suffering from mental retardation, neither
statute attempts to define mental retardation.
Although capital punishment has been outlawed in federal criminal cases, the
vast majority of capital punishment prosecutions arise in state courts. At the
time of Atkins, twenty states still had death penalty statutes that allowed for the
capital punishment of mentally retarded criminals.295 After the Court's ruling
in Atkins, these states face the challenging task of developing new procedures
for sentencing mentally retarded criminals who had been convicted of capital
296crimes.
B. Oklahoma Impact
The Supreme Court's decision in Atkins will greatly impact Oklahoma
criminal cases in which the State seeks the death penalty against a mentally
retarded criminal. Before Atkins, Oklahoma allowed mentally retarded
criminals to be sentenced to death.297 More than likely, inmates currently on
death row and those being prosecuted for capital crimes will argue that they are
mentally retarded and, therefore, cannot be constitutionally sentenced to death.
The ambiguous nature of determining mental retardation will result in a capital
trial becoming a game in which capital defendants attempt to feign the
conditions of mental retardation in order to avoid a death sentence.29 As of
February 2004, Oklahoma has four inmates on death row with scheduled or
pending mental retardation hearings.299
295. Atkins 1, 536 U.S. at 342 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Alabama, California, Delaware, Idaho,
Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming).
296. To help meet this challenge, James Ellis, Regents Professor of Law at the University
of New Mexico School of Law, has written a guide to aid state legislatures in developing and
implementing death penalty legislation that fully conforms to the constitutional requirements
set forth by the Atkins court. James W. Ellis, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty: A
Guide to State Legislative Issues, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/MREllisLeg.pdf (last
visited Mar. 5, 2004). Professor Ellis has outlined two alternative approaches, each of which
provides for an impartial evaluation of the defendant's mental retardation. Id. at 17. The first
alternative (Alternative A) offered by Professor Ellis "begins with a pretrial bench hearing on
death eligibility, with a subsequent opportunity for the defense to present the issue to a trial
jury." Id. The second alternative (Alternative B) provides for separate juries for the two
proceedings, one jury to initially decide the issue of mental retardation, and another jury to be
the ultimate "trier of fact." Id. In comparing the two alternatives, Professor Ellis has concluded
that, although both are constitutionally proper, Alternative A is "the more economical approach
because it involves the costs attendant to only one jury proceeding." Id. at 18.
297. See supra note 94.
298. Atkins 1, 536 U.S. at 353-54 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
299. Oklahoma Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty, available at http://www.ocadp.org
(Execution Watch - Oklahoma Link) (last visited Mar. 17, 2004).
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In September 2002, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals had its first
opportunity to address the constitutional principles established by the Atkins
decision. The goal of the court in Murphy v. State3°° was "to give guidance to
the various district court judges, attorneys, and death row inmates who may be
affected by what appears to be a new rule of constitutional law."3 1  As
mentioned previously, prior to Atkins, mentally retarded individuals in
Oklahoma were capable of committing crimes and were sentenced to the full
extent of the law.3" 2 The State of Oklahoma's ability to sentence the mentally
retarded to death would have changed during the 2002 legislative session if not
for Governor Frank Keating's veto of House Bill 2635.303 Because of the
disagreement that currently exists in Oklahoma between the legislative and
executive branches of government, "the task falls upon this Court to develop
standards to guide those affected until the other branches of government can
reach a meeting of the minds on this issue."3°4
Although the Supreme Court in Atkins was adamant in barring the execution
of mentally retarded criminals, the Court was unwilling to endorse a specific
definition of "mental retardation.""3 5 The Court preferred to leave to the States
the task of establishing criteria for determining "who is or who is not mentally
retarded for purposes of eligibility for a death sentence. '30 6 Accordingly, the
300. 2002 OK CR 32, 54 P.3d 556. In Murphy, the petitioner had been convicted of first-
degree murder and sentenced to death. Id. 1 1, 54 P.3d at 560. In February 2002, he filed for
postconviction relief on the basis that his trial and appellate counsel failed to present available
mitigating evidence of his deprived background and mental retardation. Id. 15, 54 P.3d at 561.
301. Id. 127, 54 P.3d at 566-67.
302. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 152 (2001) ("All persons are capable of committing crimes,"
including mentally retarded individuals, unless the individual can show that "at the time of
committing the act charged against them they were incapable of knowing its wrongfulness.");
see also supra note 94.
303. Murphy, 127 nn.13-14, 54 P.3d at 567 nn.13-14.
304. Id. 30, 54 P.3d at 567.
305. Id. 1 29, 54 P.3d at 567 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002)).
306. Id. (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317); see, e.g., State v. Williams, 831 So. 2d 835 (La.
2002). The State of Louisiana has defined mental retardation as "'significantly subaverage
general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior, and
manifested during the developmental period."' Id. at 853 (quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
28:381(28) (West 2001)). Within this definition, "'[g]eneral intellectual functioning' is shown
by "'the results obtained by assessment with one or more of the individually administered
general intelligence tests developed for that purpose."' Id. (quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
28:381(18)). Furthermore, "[tlo be 'significantly subaverage"' means that "one must be 'more
than two standard deviations below the mean for the test of intellectual functioning."' Id.
(quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:381(42)). In addition to the basic definition of mental
retardation accepted by Louisiana, the state requires that the defendant establish that his
developmental disability is attributable to mental retardation, which requires a showing that the
disability was present prior to age twenty-two and is likely to continue ad infinitum. Id.
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Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, in lieu of a legislative amendment to the
Oklahoma Criminal Code, has instituted the following definition of mental
retardation to be applied to individuals who claim to be ineligible for capital
punishment on the basis of mental retardation:
A person is "mentally retarded": (1) If he or she functions at a
significantly sub-average intellectual level that substantially limits
his or her ability to understand and process information, to
communicate, to learn from experience or mistakes, to engage in
logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the
reactions of others; (2) The mental retardation manifested itself
before the age of eighteen (18); and (3) The mental retardation is
accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at
least two of the following skill areas: communication; self-care;
social/interpersonal skills; home living; self-direction; academics;
health and safety; use of community resources; and work. °7
The Murphy court placed the burden of proof on the defendant to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that he is mentally retarded.0 8 It is interesting
to note that the court elected not to apply the "clear and convincing" standard for
proving mental retardation that the Oklahoma legislature adopted as part of
(quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:381(12)).
307. Murphy, 31, 54 P.3d at 567-68 (citation omitted). The Court explains what is meant
by "manifestation before the age of eighteen" in a footnote, stating that it is "a fact question
intended to establish that the first signs of mental retardation appeared and were recognized
before the [age of] eighteen. Lay opinion and poor school records may be considered. Thus,
a defendant need not, necessarily, introduce an intelligent quotient test administered before the
age of eighteen or a medical opinion given before the age of eighteen .. " Id. 31 n. 19, 54
P.3d at 568 n. 19. Justice Chapel in a concurring opinion noted certain issues that may arise
given the majority's definition of mental retardation. He pointed out practical problems, such
as where a defendant, who is clearly mentally retarded and has "an IQ of 56, tested near the time
of the crime, and a showing of little or no ability to function according to the enumerated
categories," may be subject to the death penalty due to a lack of "proof of manifestation before
the age of 18." Id. 8, 54 P.3d at 574 (Chapel, J., concurring). In his view, "the definition of
mental retardation should be flexible enough that an entire class of mentally retarded persons
is not automatically (and illegally) exposed to the death penalty simply because their situation
prevents them from bringing forth evidence from childhood." Id. (Chapel, J., concurring).
In the case of Patrick Dwayne Murphy, his alleged "mild mental retardation" was one of
those "borderline cases" where experts could disagree on the issue of whether Murphy actually
suffered from mental retardation. Id. 29 n.17, 54 P.3d at 567 n.17. In fact, Murphy's own
expert stated that Murphy's mental deficiencies could possibly be the result of "testing
conditions [and] cultural factors." Id. Murphy performed "reasonably well in school, although
some of his school records indicated [that] he was 'educable mentally handicapped."' Id.
308. Id. 31, 54 P.3d at 568.
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House Bill 2635.309 While recognizing this discrepancy, the court was quick to
point out that other states have been split between the adoption of a
preponderance standard or a clear and convincing standard for proof of mental
retardation."' The court also noted that in meeting this burden of proof, IQ
should be considered as a factor, but cannot alone determine a defendant's
mental retardation.3" However, the court held that "no person shall be eligible
to be considered mentally retarded unless he or she has an intelligence quotient
of seventy or below, as reflected by at least one scientifically recognized,
scientifically approved, and contemporary intelligent quotient test."
312
In addition to providing the criteria for determining mental retardation, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals outlined the process for determining
whether a defendant is eligible for a death sentence. The court held that a
defendant alleging mental retardation in an attempt to avoid the death penalty
must give notice to the court of his intent to claim mental retardation no fewer
than forty-five days before trial. 3 If such notice is properly given, the issue of
mental retardation will be decided in the sentencing stage of the defendant's
capital murder trial. 14 At the time of sentencing, if the jury concludes that the
309. See Appendix A for the text of the bill. Justice Chapel in his concurrence in Murphy
pointed out that the U.S. Supreme Court has deemed a clear and convincing burden of proof to
be unconstitutional in the "competency context." Murphy, 5 n.7, 54 P.3d at 573 n.7 (Chapel,
J., concurring) (citing Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996)).
310. Murphy, 31 n.20, 54 P.3d at 568 n.20 ("[A]pproximately five states utilize a clear and
convincing standard while approximately eleven states use preponderance of the evidence.").
311. Id. 31,54P.3dat568.
312. Id. (citation omitted). The Court of Criminal Appeals explained that a contemporary
IQ test was one that "was administered some time after the capital crime was committed or is
one that may be understood by contemporary standards." Id. 31 n.21, 54 P.3d at 568 n.21.
Furthermore, Justice Chapel noted that by limiting the issue of mental retardation in capital
cases only to those with an IQ below 70, the Court has taken a more narrow approach than the
Oklahoma Legislature, who in House Bill 2635 did not prohibit those defendants with an IQ
over 70 from raising the issue of mental retardation. Id. 7, 54 P.3d at 574 (Chapel, J.,
concurring).
313. Id. 32, 54 P.3d at 568.
314. Id. The "Jury Instruction To Be Used When Issue of Mental Retardation Has Been
Raised" reads as follows:
A conviction for Murder in the First Degree is punishable by death, life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole, or life imprisonment. The
Defendant has raised mental retardation as a bar to the imposition of the death
penalty in this case. You must determine if the Defendant suffers from mental
retardation as it is defined below before deciding what sentence to impose.
You are advised that a person is "mentally retarded" if he or she functions at
a significantly sub-average intellectual level that substantially limits his or her
ability to understand and process information, to communicate, to learn from
experience or mistakes, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and
20031
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2003
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:879
convicted defendant is mentally retarded, then it cannot render a sentence of
death. " 5 However, if the convicted defendant fails to meet his burden of proof,
and the jury concludes that he is not mentally retarded, the intellectual
capabilities of the defendant may still be considered by the jury as a mitigating
factor in rendering punishment upon the defendant. 6 Furthermore, if the jury
imposes a death sentence despite the alleged mental retardation of the defendant,
the court has provided for the possibility of postjudgment relief in the form of
an Atkins hearing.317
A postjudgment Atkins hearing will take place only at the defendant's
request."' The hearing allows the judge to "determin[e] if the jury's decision
on the issue of mental retardation has resulted in an excessive sentence, i.e., a
sentence that imposed the death penalty upon a defendant who is mentally
to understand the reactions of others. Intelligence quotients are one of the many
factors that may be considered, but are not alone determinative.
In reaching your decision, you must determine:
(1) Is the defendant a person who is mentally retarded as defined in this
instruction?
(2) Was the mental retardation present and known before the defendant was
eighteen (18) years of age?
(3) Does the defendant have significant limitations in adaptive functions in at
least two of the following skill areas: communication; self-care;
social/interpersonal skills; home living; self-direction; academics; health and
safety; use of community resources; and work?
If you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the answer to each of these
questions is yes, then you must so indicate on your verdict form. You must then
decide whether the defendant shall be sentenced to life imprisonment or life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole and so indicate on your verdict
form. If you find the answer to any of the above questions is no, you must so
indicate on your verdict form. You must then decide whether the defendant shall
be sentenced to life imprisonment, life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole or death.
Preponderance of the evidence means more probable than not.
Id. app., 54 P.3d app. at 570-71. Justice Johnson in a dissenting opinion proposed an alternative
procedure for the determination of mental retardation. He stated,
The trial court should hold a pretrial evidentiary hearing to determine mental
retardation. If the trial court determines by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant is mentally retarded, the trial would proceed as a non-capital first-
degree murder case. If the court should not so find, the jury then would make this
determination prior to any second stage evidence.
Id. 1 2, 54 P.3d at 572 (Johnson, V.P.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
315. Id. 33, 54 P.3d at 568.
316. Id.
317. Id. 34, 54 P.3d at 568.
318. Id.
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retarded, as herein defined., 319 The defendant must make his written request for
an Atkins hearing "within ten (10) days of the jury verdict and prior to formal
sentencing." 320 During the Atkins hearing, both parties will be allowed to make
oral arguments; however, no additional evidence apart from that in the trial
record will be admitted.32' Upon completion of the Atkins hearing, the judge
will determine if the jury's imposition of capital punishment was made "under
the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor," which would
cause the sentence to be excessive.322 Additionally, the judge will make his own
determination of the defendant's mental retardation, based upon the same
evidence and definition of mental retardation presented to the jury.323 Applying
the same preponderance of the evidence standard, the judge will "make written
findings and conclusions upon whether or not the defendant is mentally
retarded.., and file those written findings and conclusions in the record within
fifteen (15) days of the hearing, as an exhibit to the trial judges [sic] report. 324
The impact of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Atkins will not only
affect future capital criminals in Oklahoma, but it will also affect those currently
on death row who may in fact be able to prove mental retardation. In Murphy,
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held that criminals with pending
capital appeals and those seeking post-conviction relief from a capital
conviction may raise the issue of mental retardation by filing an application if
the following circumstances are met:
[I]n] those cases where evidence of the defendant's mental
retardation was introduced at trial and/or the defendant either (1)
received an instruction that his or her mental retardation was a
mitigating factor for the jury to consider, (2) appealed his death
sentence and therein raised the claim that the execution of the
mentally retarded was cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (or a substantially
similar claim relating to his or her mental retardation), or (3) raised
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, on appeal or in a
previous post-conviction application, in which he or she asserted trial
counsel or appellate counsel failed to raise the claim that the
319. Id. 34, 54 P.3d at 568-69 (citation omitted).
320. Id. 34 n.22, 54 P.3d at 568 n.22.
321. Id.
322. Id. 35, 54 P.3d at 569. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has been given the
duty of conducting a sentence review of every criminal defendant who has been sentenced to
death. See 21 OKLA. STAT. § 701.13 (2001).
323. Murphy, 35, 54 P.3d at 569.
324. Id.
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execution of the mentally retarded was cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.325
Although the true impact of the Atkins decision is yet to be seen in Oklahoma,
there is no doubt that in the near future, the Oklahoma legislature will be
pressured to adopt a statutory process for dealing with capital criminals who
raise the issue of mental retardation. Whether the legislature will incorporate
any of the procedural requirements outlined by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals is unknown. However, one thing is for certain: while the U.S. Supreme
Court did not give the Oklahoma legislature the opportunity to decide whether
it would allow mentally retarded criminals to be sentenced to death, it did allow
the legislature to determine which criminals would be considered mentally
retarded.
VIII. Conclusion
As this Comment has demonstrated, the Supreme Court's decision in Atkins
is a prime example of the Court acting as a legislature for the people. Rather
than following clearly established principles of Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence, the Court subjectively chose to ban capital punishment for all
mentally retarded criminals. The Court's holding is not supported by the history
or the text of the Eighth Amendment, does not give proper weight to objective
factors in analyzing the standards of decency, and fails to allow for an
individualized determination of a mentally retarded person's moral culpability
for his crime. Ultimately, it is the mentally retarded criminal whose life has
been spared, while the U.S. Constitution and the will of the American people
have been executed.
Daniel Nickel
325. Id. 36, 54 P.3d at 569.
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APPENDIX A
Rep. Opio Toure of Oklahoma City introduced House Bill 2635, which reads
as follows:
SECTION 1. NEW LAW A new section of law to be codified in the
Oklahoma Statutes as Section 701.10b of Title 21, unless there is created a
duplication in numbering, reads as follows:
A. For purposes of this act:
1. "Mentally retarded" means significantly subaverage general intellectual
functioning, existing concurrently with significant limitations in adaptive
functioning, both of which were manifested before the age of eighteen (18);
2. "Significant limitations in adaptive functioning" means significant
limitations in two or more of the following adaptive skill areas:
communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self-
direction, health, safety, functional academics, leisure skills and work skills;
and
3. "Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning" means an
intelligence quotient of seventy (70) or below.
B. Regardless of any provision of law to the contrary, no defendant who
is mentally retarded shall be sentenced to death.
C. Upon motion of the defendant, supported by appropriate affidavits, the
court may order a pretrial hearing to determine if the defendant is mentally
retarded. The defendant has the burden of production and persuasion to
demonstrate mental retardation by clear and convincing evidence by
showing significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning,
significant limitations in adaptive functioning, and that mental retardation
was manifested before the age of eighteen (18). An intelligence quotient of
seventy (70) or below on an individually administered, scientifically
recognized standardized intelligence quotient test administered by a licensed
psychiatrist or psychologist is evidence of significantly subaverage general
intellectual functioning; however, it is not sufficient, without evidence of
significant limitations in adaptive functioning and without evidence of
manifestation before the age of eighteen (18). If the court determines the
defendant to be mentally retarded, the court shall declare the case
noncapital, and the state may not seek the death penalty against the
defendant. The pretrial determination of the court shall not preclude the
defendant from raising any legal defense during the trial.
D. If the court does not find the defendant to be mentally retarded in the
pretrial proceeding, upon the introduction of evidence of the mental
retardation of the defendant during the sentencing hearing, the court shall
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submit a special issue to the jury as to whether the defendant is mentally
retarded as defined in this section. This special issue shall be considered
and answered by the jury prior to the consideration of aggravating or
mitigating factors and the determination of sentence. If the jury determines
the defendant to be mentally retarded, the court shall declare the case
noncapital, and the defendant shall be sentenced to life imprisonment or life
without parole. The defendant has the burden of production and persuasion
to demonstrate mental retardation to the jury by a preponderance of the
evidence.
E. If the jury determines that the defendant is not mentally retarded as
defined by this section, the jury may consider any evidence of mental
retardation presented during the sentencing hearing when determining
aggravating or mitigating factors and the sentence of the defendant.
F. The provisions of this section do not preclude the sentencing of a
mentally retarded offender to any other sentence authorized by Section 701.9
of Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes for the crime of murder in the first
degree.
G. The court shall give appropriate instructions in those cases in which
evidence of the mental retardation of the defendant requires the
consideration by the jury of the provisions of this section.
SECTION 2. NEW LAW A new section of law to be codified in the
Oklahoma Statutes as Section 1089A of Title 22, unless there is created a
duplication in numbering, reads as follows:
A. In cases in which the defendant has been convicted of first-degree
murder, sentenced to death, and is in custody awaiting imposition of the
death penalty, the defendant may seek appropriate relief from the death
sentence of the defendant upon the ground that the defendant was mentally
retarded, as defined in Section 1 of this act, at the time of the commission of
the capital crime.
B. A motion seeking appropriate relief from a death sentence on the
ground that the defendant is mentally retarded, shall be filed:
1. On or before January 31, 2003, if the conviction of the defendant and
sentence of death were entered prior to July 1, 2002; and
2. Within one hundred twenty (120) days of the imposition of a sentence
of death if the trial of the defendant was in progress on July 1, 2002. For
purposes of this section, a trial is considered to be in progress if the process
of jury selection has begun.
C. All matters regarding the motion, seeking relief from a death sentence
upon the ground that the defendant was mentally retarded, not specifically
governed by the provisions of this section shall be subject to provisions of
Section 1089 of Title 22 of the Oklahoma Statutes. If the provisions of this
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section conflict with the provisions of Section 1089 of Title 22 of the
Oklahoma Statutes, the provisions of this section shall govern.
SECTION 3. This act shall become effective July 1, 2002.
SECTION 4. It being immediately necessary for the preservation of the
public peace, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, by
reason whereof this act shall take effect and be in full force from and after
its passage and approval.
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